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ABSTRACT
Advances in the fabrication technology have been a major driving force in the unprecedented in-
crease in computing capabilities over the last several decades. Despite huge reductions in the switching
energy of the transistors, two major issues have emerged with decreasing fabrication technology scales.
They are: 1) increased impact of process, voltage, and temperature (PVT) variation on transistor per-
formance, and 2) increased susceptibility of transistors to soft errors induced by high energy particles.
In presence of PVT variation, as transistor sizes continue to decrease, the design margins used to guar-
antee correct operation in the presence of worst-case scenarios have been increasing.
Systems run at a clock frequency, which is determined by accounting the worst-case timing paths,
operating conditions, and process variations. Timing speculation based reliable and aggressive clocking
advocates going beyond worst-case limits to achieve best performance while not avoiding, but detect-
ing and correcting a modest number of timing errors. Such design methodology exploit the fact that
timing critical paths are rarely exercised in a design, and typical execution happens much faster than
the timing requirements dictated by worst-case scenarios. Better-than-worst-case design methodology
is advocated by several recent research pursuits, which propose to exploit in-built fault tolerance mech-
anisms to enhance computer system performance. Recent works have also shown that the performance
lose due to over provisioning base on worst-case design margins is upward of 20% in terms operating
frequency and upward of 50% in terms of power efficiency.
The threat of soft error induced system failure in computing systems has become more prominent
as we adopt ultra-deep submicron process technologies. With respect to soft error susceptibility, de-
creasing transistor geometries lower the energy threshold needed by high-energy particles to induce
errors. As this trend continues, the need for fault tolerance mechanisms to counteract this effect has
moved from a nice to have, to be a requirement in current and future systems. In this dissertation,
xiii
RAKSHA (meaning to protect and save in Sanskrit), we take a multidimensional look at the challenges
of system design built with scaled-technologies using high integrity techniques.
In RAKSHA, to mitigate soft errors, we propose lightweight high-integrity mechanisms as basic
system building blocks which allow system to offer performance levels comparable to a non-fault tol-
erant system. In addition, we also propose to effectively exploit and use the availability of fault tolerant
mechanisms to allow and tolerate data-dependent failures, thus setting systems to operate at typical case
circuit delays and enhance system performance. We also propose the use of novel high-integrity cells
for increasing system energy efficiency and also potentially increasing system security by combating
power-analysis-based side channel attacks. Such an approach allows balancing of performance, power,
and security with no further overhead over the resources needed to incorporate fault tolerance. Using
our framework, instead of designing circuits to meet worst-case requirements, circuits can be designed
to meet typical-case requirements.
In RAKSHA, we propose two efficient soft error mitigation schemes, namely Soft Error Mitiga-
tion (SEM) and Soft and Timing Error Mitigation (STEM), using the approach of multiple clocking
of data for protecting combinational logic blocks from soft errors. Our first technique, SEM, based
on distributed and temporal voting of three registers, unloads the soft error detection overhead from
the critical path of the systems. SEM is also capable of ignoring false errors and recovers from soft
errors using in-situ fast recovery avoiding recomputation. Our second technique, STEM, while toler-
ating soft errors, adds timing error detection capability to guarantee reliable execution in aggressively
clocked designs that enhance system performance by operating beyond worst-case clock frequency.
We also present a specialized low overhead clock phase management scheme that ably supports our
proposed techniques. Timing annotated gate level simulations, using 45nm libraries, of a pipelined
adder-multiplier and DLX processor show that both our techniques achieve near 100% fault coverage.
For DLX processor, even under severe fault injection campaigns, SEM achieves an average perfor-
mance improvement of 26.58% over a conventional triple modular redundancy voter based soft error
mitigation scheme, while STEM outperforms SEM by 27.42%. We refer to systems built with SEM
and STEM cells as reliable and aggressive systems.
Energy consumption minimization in computing systems has attracted a great deal of attention and
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has also become critical due to battery life considerations and environmental concerns. To address this
problem, many task scheduling algorithms are developed using dynamic voltage and frequency scaling
(DVFS). Majority of these algorithms involve two passes: schedule generation and slack reclamation.
Using this approach, linear combination of frequencies has been proposed to achieve near optimal
energy for systems operating with discrete and traditional voltage frequency pairs. In RAKSHA, we
propose a new slack reclamation algorithm, aggressive dynamic and voltage scaling (ADVFS), using
reliable and aggressive systems. ADVFS exploits the enhanced voltage frequency spectrum offered by
reliable and aggressive designs for improving energy efficiency. Formal proofs are provided to show
that optimal energy for reliable and aggressive designs is either achieved by using single frequency or
by linear combination of frequencies. ADVFS has been evaluated using random task graphs and our
results show 18% reduction in energy when compared with continuous DVFS and over more than 33%
when compared with scheme using linear combination of traditional voltage frequency pairs.
Recent events have indicated that attackers are banking on side-channel attacks, such as differential
power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA), to exploit information leaks from physi-
cal devices. Random dynamic voltage frequency scaling (RDVFS) has been proposed to prevent such
attacks and has very little area, power, and performance overheads. But due to the one-to-one map-
ping present between voltage and frequency of DVFS voltage-frequency pairs, RDVFS cannot prevent
power attacks. In RAKSHA, we propose a novel countermeasure that uses reliable and aggressive de-
signs to break this one-to-one mapping. Our experiments show that our technique significantly reduces
the correlation for the actual key and also reduces the risk of power attacks by increasing the proba-
bility for incorrect keys to exhibit maximum correlation. Moreover, our scheme also enables systems
to operate beyond the worst-case estimates to offer improved power and performance benefits. For the
experiments conducted on AES S-box implemented using 45nm CMOS technology, our approach has
increased performance by 22% over the worst-case estimates. Also, it has decreased the correlation
for the correct key by an order and has increased the probability by almost 3.5X times for wrong keys
when compared with the original key to exhibit maximum correlation. Overall, RAKSHA offers a new
way to balance the intricate interplay between various design constraints for the systems designed using
small scaled-technologies.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The progress made in fabrication technology over the last several decades has been the primary
driving force in the corresponding explosion of computing capability. However, as fabrication technol-
ogy continues to produce faster transistors at smaller geometries, the extraction of their full computing
potential has become increasingly challenging. One of the biggest issues in such realization is the
increasing impact that process, voltage, and temperature (PVT) variation have on designing systems
built using these small-scale transistors. The state of the art in today’s commercial designs use worst-
case PVT variation analysis to help provide correct operation guarantees. Industry has been concerned
about PVT variation for years and have combated this issue by employing post-fabrication speed bin-
ning techniques to allow them to sell faster chips at higher prices, thus increasing their profit margins.
Even the post-fabrication tuning is governed by conservative principles and the working boundaries are
still set by worst-case estimates. The result of worst-case analysis is conservative guard banding and
resource over provisioning for the design to work properly. The gap in performance between designing
for the worst-case versus the typical-case is becoming large. Brooks, in 2009, showed that design-
ing for the worst-case condition as opposed to the typical-case condition can cost more than 20% in
operating frequency performance, and more than 50% in power efficiency [33].
1.1 Fault Tolerance
Overclocking as a means to improve performance is a popular technique among enthusiasts [24].
Microprocessor vendors are even introducing capabilities in the chipset, examples being AMD’s Over-
drive and Advanced Clock Calibration techniques, to support overclocking. The latest 45nm AMD
Phenom II processor has been overclocked to upwards of 5GHz from its rated frequency of 2.8GHz,
using liquid nitrogen cooling [85]. Frequency binning and discreteness in artifact grading are con-
2tributing to this improvement in performance through overclocking. Also, circuits exhibit worst case
delay only when their longest delay paths are sensitized by the inputs. However, these worst case delay
inducing inputs and operating conditions are rare, leading to room for performance improvement that
overclockers exploit [4]. The problem is that timing errors may occur at overclocked speeds, so in order
to reliably take advantage of this improvement in execution time, the processor must be made in some
way tolerant to errors.
Overclocking without guaranteeing functional correctness leads to unpredictable system behavior
and loss of data. Aggressive, but reliable, design methodologies employ relevant timing error detection
and recovery schemes to prevent erroneous data from being used [25, 27]. In [9, 73], it has been
shown that operating frequency can be increased beyond worst case limit, allowing systems to operate
at optimal clock frequency, by adapting to the current set of instructions and environmental conditions.
Performance gains as high as 50% was achieved for a small recoverable error rate of 1%.
Nano-sized transistors, coupled with deployment in hazardous environments, have magnified the
reliability concerns plaguing modern computing systems. Rapid enhancements in VLSI technology
have fueled the increasing apprehension of system hardware being susceptible to myriad of faults.
Many fault tolerance techniques are proposed at different levels of design hierarchy, starting from the
design of hardened latches to system-level fault tolerant architectures [1, 3, 29, 49]. All these techniques
strive to provide high degrees of fault coverage by providing redundancy in either information, spatial or
temporal domains. For example, on-chip memories, which are regularly structured arrays, are protected
by Error Correcting Codes (ECC) against transient bit-flips, also known as, soft errors [20]. ECC
applies information redundancy to mitigate soft errors, while incurring resource overhead, in terms of
area and power.
Technology scaling has also radically impacted the soft error occurrence and fault tolerance is
becoming increasingly important in today’s and future designs due to their increasing susceptibility to
soft errors. In the past, single event upsets (SEUs) were a major concern in space applications creating
hard threats like loss of control, which often lead to catastrophic system failures. An SEU is caused
when a high energy particle, either from cosmic radiation or decaying radioactive material, strikes the
silicon substrate. If enough charge is deposited by the strike, it causes a bit flip in the memory cell or a
3transient pulse in the combinational logic. The latter is referred to as a Single Event Transient (SET).
A report by NASA, in September 2009, indicates that cosmic ray intensities have increased 19% above
the previous space-age highs [58]. Study conducted by Normand in [60], provide recent evidence of
upsets at ground level, which implies, terrestrial applications also require fault tolerant techniques to
ensure their dependability.
With shrinking transistor feature sizes, supply voltages and node capacitance’s of the circuits are
getting smaller and smaller. However, this lowers the energy threshold needed by high-energy particles
to induce errors. It results in rapid increase in number of particles in the flux that can induce a soft error.
As indicated in [70], the problem of soft errors in combinational circuits is becoming comparable to
that of unprotected memory elements in current and future technologies. Radiation induced SET pulses
have widths in the range of 500ps to 900ps in the 90nm process, as compared to 400ps to 700ps in the
130nm process [56].
Providing fault tolerance capabilities for random and complex logic is expensive, both in terms of
area and power. Techniques such as, duplication and comparison, and temporal triple modular redun-
dancy (TMR) and majority voting have been proposed to mitigate soft error rate in logic circuits [48].
These approaches pay penalty for false errors and incur performance overhead even during error-free
operation. Also at this juncture, when static power is comparable to dynamic power, logic replication
is not a viable alternative. Therefore, to recover from such errors, it is therefore imperative that fault
tolerance be built into systems using small-scale transistors.
1.2 Energy Efficiency
Power consumption has become an important concern in the design of computer systems today
due to battery life considerations and environmental concerns. Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling
(DVFS) is an effective method to control the trade-off between performance and power consumption of
computing systems. DVFS schemes dynamically scale the voltage and frequency of the CPU to provide
variable amount of energy to process the workload. In general, scaling down voltage or frequency
of the processor, results in reducing dynamic power consumption. Intel SpeedStep, Advance Micro
Devices (AMD) PowerNow!, and Transmeta LongRun [64, 2, 28] are few examples for DVFS in real
4processors. Recent developments include providing support for deeper integration of DVFS like adding
more power saving states (like deep p-states and c-states) [65].
Task scheduling play crucial role in multiprocessor systems which are widely deployed in high per-
formance computing systems like super computers, computer clusters etc. Task scheduling algorithms
for the multiprocessor system are usually developed based on the task graph. DVFS technique and task
scheduling can be combined to form a two phase process for effective resource usage and energy con-
sumption minimization. In this approach, first phase involve schedule generation, where tasks from the
given task graph are scheduled on a given multi-processor system by attempting to maximize objective
function which include minimizing makespan. In second phase, which involve slack reclamation, the
output of first phase is post processed to minimize the energy consumption using DVFS technique and
also without violating the deadline constraint.
The existing slack reclamation methods based on DVFS technique has a major shortcoming as they
map each task to a single frequency among the available discrete set of (V, f ) pairs of underlying DVFS
platforms. As shown in [63], using only single frequency results in uncovered slack time, which reflect
into energy wastage. To minimize uncovered slack time, a novel approach, multiple voltage-frequency
selection dynamic voltage frequency scaling (MVFS-DVFS), has been proposed. MVFS-DVFS uses
linear combination of frequencies for slack reclamation. With MVFS-DVFS technique, authors have
shown that energy consumption can be pushed to the near optimal point of using (V, f ) pairs supported
by traditional DVFS schemes. However, MVFS-DVFS does not include the additional voltage and
frequency swings that are possible by reliable and aggressive designs, which are built to operate beyond
worst-case estimates..
1.3 Security
As implementation technology scales to nano-scale dimensions, electronic systems are now built
with more complex and powerful integrated circuits. Along with the performance and power con-
straints, security also is emerging as a first class design constraint. This is especially true for embedded
systems, which are deployed widely in domains ranging from mobile phones to smart cards. Rapid
enhancements in VLSI technology, combined with innovations at various design hierarchies have con-
5tributed to meet the power and the performance constraints. For all concerns related to security, cryp-
tography is being applied to guard the systems from known attacks.
Power analysis attacks are cryptanalytic attacks that exploit information leaks from a cryptographic
system. The idea to use cryptographic system power traces for extracting secret key was first presented
by Kocher [39]. Power analysis attacks involve two basic techniques: Simple power analysis (SPA)
and differential power analysis (DPA). SPA attacks involve first order power analysis and are mounted
on systems by using the fact that different operations in secret-key crypto algorithms consume different
power. Using SPA attacks, secret information, such as secret key or parts of it, is inferred directly
through visual inspection of the power traces. DPA attacks are based on statistical computations and are
much powerful than SPA attacks as no detailed knowledge about the cryptographic system is required.
An alternative to DPA was suggested by Brier named Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), which offers
more efficient power analysis based on linear correlation techniques [15].
We develop a new countermeasure using dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS). Earlier,
a similar approach, named random dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (RDVFS), was investigated
by Yang et. al. to reduce the correlation of input data to the power consumption. RDVFS reduce
the correlation by varying the system voltage and frequency randomly [87]. But, later it was shown
that RDVFS approach cannot prevent DPA/CPA power attacks [7]. Major limitation for RDVFS based
countermeasure is on account of one-to-one mapping between voltage and frequency of DVFS (V, f )
pairs. We overcome this inherent limitation of DVFS platforms by breaking the one-to-one mapping
between voltage and frequency of (V, f ) pairs.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
Given that future architectures will have fault tolerance mechanisms built in, our goal in RAKSHA
(meaning to protect and save in Sanskrit) is to extract the full computing potential of small-scale tech-
nology effectively. We propose to develop and deploy lightweight high-integrity mechanisms that allow
circuits to aggressively, yet reliably, operate beyond their conservative worst-case limits. In addition,
we further develop slack reclamation algorithms for scheduling tasks in reliable and aggressive systems
built using our high integrity techniques to increase system energy efficiency. Our mechanisms also of-
6fer a potential solution to increase system security by combating power-analysis-based side channel
attacks.
The main contributions of this thesis are:
• We propose two efficient soft error mitigation schemes, Soft Error Migigation (SEM) and Soft
and Timing Error Mitigation (STEM), considering the approach of multiple clocking of data for
tolerating soft errors in combinational logic. Both these techniques remove the error detection
overhead from the circuit critical path. These specialized register cells provide near 100% fault
tolerance against transient faults. Our schemes tolerate fast transient noise pulses, which is the
principal characteristic of SETs. Both our schemes have no significant performance overhead
during error-free operation. SEM cells are capable of ignoring false positives and recovers from
errors using in-situ fast recovery avoiding recomputation. STEM cells has soft error mitigation
characteristics similar to SEM. STEM cells allow reliable dynamic overclocking and are capable
of tolerating timing errors as well. We also propose a scheme to manage phase shifts between
clocks locally with constant delay values. Such an approach increases the possible frequency
settings for aggressively clocked designs and also minimizes the clock routing resources.
• We address the energy consumption minimization issue by proposing a new task scheduling al-
gorithm, which continue to play an important role in design of real-time systems and in high
performance computing systems. In this thesis, we propose a new slack reclamation algorithm,
aggressive dynamic and voltage scaling (ADVFS), using reliable and aggressive systems. AD-
VFS exploits the enhanced voltage frequency spectrum offered by reliable and aggressive designs
for improving energy efficiency. We also provide guidelines on how to manage the enhanced volt-
age frequency spectrum and the constraints required for limiting the maximum attainable under
ADVFS. We also provide formal proofs to show that significant energy savings are attainable
either by using single frequency or by linear combination of frequencies. Our scheme can be
integrated as post processing step with any of the existing static and dynamic task scheduling
algorithms.
• We present an effective countermeasure to counteract DPA/CPA based attacks by employing
7reliable and aggressive designs. Salient feature of our approach lays in enabling systems to
operate beyond the worst-case estimates while breaking the one-to-one relationship between the
voltage and the frequency of synchronous circuits. Our technique, Aggressive frequency scaling
(AFS), also increases the entropy of power traces and pushes the performance to higher levels by
exploiting data heterogeneity. Also, our technique reduces the probability to observe maximum
correlation value for the correct key and prevents power attacks by increasing the probability for
incorrect keys to exhibit maximum correlation value.
1.5 Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapater 3, we present design and error
recovery details of reliable and aggressive designs. In Chapter 4, we present our high integrity tech-
niques, SEM and STEM. In Chapter 5, we present our task scheduling algorithm to improve energy
efficiency for reliable and aggressive systems built using our high integrity techniques. In Chapter 6, we
present our approach for preventing power attacks using reliable and aggressive designs and conclude
thesis in Chapter 7.
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In this chapter, review of relevant previous work is presented. In Section 2.1, a brief review of
better-than-worst-case designs is presented. Section 2.2 presents a brief review of soft error aware
computing and Section 2.3 presents a brief review of work that aims at improving energy efficiency. In
Section 2.4, we present background realted to our task scheduling algorithm. In Section 2.5, we present
various security countermeasures that are developed to prevent power attacks and their assosciated
limitations.
2.1 Better-Than-Worst-Case Designs
As the performance margin between designing circuits to meet worst-case constraints verses typically-
case constraints has become increasing significant, a new area of research emerged that aimed to use
fault tolerance to allow synchronous circuits to perform reliably at the highest possible clock frequen-
cies. A good summary of the principles of this new area is presented in [4]. The methods reviewed
in [4] are good initial attempts at pushing circuits close to safe limits for increasing performance; how-
ever, most approaches are not feasible in practice. For example, in [81] a method for increasing clock
frequency is proposed by adding redundancy and clocking each stage of a pipeline at a phase shift of
the original clock. However, the overheads associated with the redundancy and clocking resources of
this approach were not addressed for deployment into real-world designs. A more recent approach is
presented in [82], where the clock frequency of a simple in-order processor was tuned dynamically. An
extra delay chain with a worst-case propagation delay greater than the critical path of the processor was
used to guide frequency tuning. The delay chain was monitored constantly and detection of errors were
used to adjust the processor’s frequency to avoid errors within the processor as operating conditions
changed. A benefit of this approach is that it avoided errors within the processor, thus eliminating the
9performance penalties often associated with error recovery circuitry. However, this approach can adapt
to changes in operating conditions, but can’t exploit data dependent circuit delay. In the SPRIT3E
project, this attribute of circuit delay has been exploited to further extend the operation boundaries
often set by worst case estimates [9, 73, 10].
Timing error tolerance techniques were employed by Razor [27] and SPRIT3E [9, 73, 10] to operate
beyond worst-case limits. While Razor focused on achieving lower energy consumption by reducing
supply voltage in each pipeline stage, SPRIT3E improved performance of a superscalar processor by
reliably overclocking its pipeline. However, in the presence of soft errors extra redundancy, either in
spatial or temporal domain, needs to be augmented with the above presented techniques in-order to
design circuits for typical-case operation. To address these concerns, we propose an efficient way to
organize this extra redundancy through our high integrity mechanisms presented in later sections of this
thesis.
2.2 Soft Error Aware Computing
A multitude of fault tolerant architectures for tolerating soft errors have been developed in the past
by the research community. Many schemes incur performance overhead even during error-free oper-
ation and do not support timing speculation. LEON-FT processor [29] uses temporal triple modular
redundancy (TMR) approach and triplicates every flip flop in the processor and incurs a 100% area
overhead. Redundant multi-threading based schemes exploit instruction level parallelism to provide
fault tolerance [83]. SSD framework [68] consists of an integrity checking architecture for superscalar
processors that can achieve fault tolerance capability of a duplex system at much less cost than the
traditional duplication approach. The REESE architecture [34] takes advantage of spare elements in a
superscalar processor to perform redundant execution. DIVA [5] uses spatial redundancy by providing
a separate, slower pipeline processor alongside the fast processor. Reunion [71] exchanges control and
data flow information between the cores to speed up execution, while leveraging the redundancy to
provide partial fault coverage. These approaches trade performance and power for achieving soft error
fault tolerant capabilities and none of these approaches support timing speculation.
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2.2.1 Problem of False Errors
To combat the problem of soft errors, spatial redundancy or time redundancy or both have been
used in previously proposed solutions [3, 48, 59, 52, 23, 66]. Dual Modular Redundant (DMR) sys-
tems employ two components to detect soft errors and the error recovery process is triggered whenever
the comparison between these two components fails. There is an error in the system only if the primary
component has an error and not in the redundant component. If we assume, probability for any com-
ponent (out of the two components) to fail is equally likely, then the false error rate is as high as 50%.
This can make systems to pay a huge penalty in the form of performance and power during the error
recovery process. This penalty is aggravated in TMR systems as the false error rate can shoot up to
66%. Moreover, voting process degrades system performance. So an ideal situation would be to reduce
power and performance penalty by lowering the false error rate or completely avoiding them.
2.2.2 Data Latching Schemes
Multiple clocking of data has been widely used to combat the issue of soft errors in combinational
logic [3, 48, 59, 52, 23, 66]. These approaches involve latching data at different times or latching data
and its delayed version using a single clock. Authors in [23] optimize a temporal TMR framework that
is presented in [48]. Even with this approach, the clock frequency at which the circuit can be clocked
must include the delays of combinational logic, double the pulse width under consideration and also
the delay incurred for the majority voting. Moreover, this technique doesn’t detect false errors. More
recently, BISER, a DMR framework, using C-elements to tolerate soft errors has been proposed [52].
It offers two techniques - 1) using logic duplication (DMR in space) and 2) time shifted data (DMR in
time). Using BISER technique, the power overhead is estimated to be between 7-11%. As discussed
by the authors in [52], hardware duplication and time redundancy techniques, such as multi-threading
for error detection and software implemented fault tolerance have very significant power overheads
when compared to BISER. Also, using C-elements, authors in [66] propose soft error hardened flip
flops to tolerate wide error pulses or hard errors and applies DMR in both time and space domains.
Another piece of closely related work is Paceline [32], which employs a leader-checker architecture
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(a DMR scheme) in a chip multiprocessor system and requires logic duplication, and checkpointing
at regular intervals. All the above presented schemes employ either DMR or TMR [48, 52, 23, 66]
and pay penalty for false errors. It is estimated that static power is comparable to dynamic power
with nano-sized transistors. Hence, providing fault tolerance for energy constrained systems with logic
replication is not a viable option. In RAKSHA, with the design of our high-integrity techniques, we
propose to completely remove the overhead paid for the false errors. Our techniques offer soft error
protection with out logic duplication and also enable timing speculation.
2.3 Power Efficiency
In [67], dynamic processor overclocking is proposed to utilize the dynamic voltage and frequency
scaling (DVFS) capabilities of processors to offer increased performance in power-constrained systems.
In [69], a multiple clock domain approach for processor design is presented for improving energy ef-
ficiency. Locally synchronous and globally asynchronous design techniques were used with the goal
of improving energy efficiency by running different parts of the processor with different clocks. Ex-
isting microprocessor queue structures were then used for inter-clock domain communication. Initial
exploration for using an aggressive framework for power savings is carried out by Razor [25], which
achieves energy consumption savings by tuning the supply voltage in each pipeline stage. However,
these schemes do not cover the solution space fully. In RAKSHA, using our high integrity techniques,
we not only expand the solution space of DVFS, we also exploit it at finer granularity that leads to
higher power efficiency and performance-power tradeoff.
2.4 Task Scheduling
A significant body of work has been published on task scheduling for real-time embedded systems
using various forms of DVFS-enabled techniques. Key idea of most of the existing algorithms is to use
processor slack time while meeting task requirements like deadline. Existing techniques can be divided
into two groups: 1) static and 2) dynamic schemes.
In static scheduling schemes, all information about the task is made available during the compile-
time and the scheduler generates schedule while meeting deadline of all tasks. Schedule generation
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involve maximing a chosen objective funtion, which often involve maximizing processor utilization
[91, 41, 90, 26]. In dynamic scheduling schemes, during compile time, only deadline information of
the task is made available. Rest of the parameters, like release time, are estimated during the run-time
and the scheduler uses this information to generate a schedule that maximizes the chosen objective
function [22, 42, 53]. Dynamic scheme are more useful, where variable system operating conditions,
like temperature, affect system performance and power. Such schemes are widely deployed in power-
aware devices like laptops. Many scheduling schemes are also proposed to make scheduler aware of
the operating temperature, which attempt to keep peak temperature below the maximum specified limit
[18, 44, 19, 51, 12]. However, most of the schemes proposed assume that system operate at traditional
voltage and frequencies.
Reliable and aggressive designs are proposed to exploit data dependence characterictics of the
underlying system circuits. Such design methodology allows frequency and voltage swings beyond
the worst case estimates. In [25], voltage swings beyond the worst case are used to reduce power
consumption with out significant perfomance loss. In [9, 73, 10], frequency swings beyond the worst
case are used to increase system performance with out significant increase in power consumption.
Other work proposed using reliable and aggressive designs attempt to increase system reliabilty from
soft errors [6]. To the best of our knowledge, no effort has been put for developing task scheduling
algorithms in systems using reliable and aggressive designs.
From prior work, most relevant to the work is presented in [37, 63]. In [37], using DVFS, authors
proposed an energy reduction algorithm, RDVFS, which selects a suitable set of (V, f ) pairs for task
execution as uniformly as possible with slight increase in the overall execution time. Authors in [63],
propose MVFS-DVFS to minimize energy consumption by using linear combination of frequencies for
slack reclamation. Our scheme, differes from the above mentioned schemes by utilizing the additional
voltage and frequency swings that are provided by reliable and aggressive desings. Utilizing such
swings, effectively utilize data dependence behavior of underlying system circuits for improving energy
efficiency and also enable typical-case operation.
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2.5 Security
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) are common side channel
attacks, that attempt to extract the secret information present in a system [45, 35]. SPA attacks involve
first order power analysis and are mounted on systems by using the fact that different operations in
crypto algorithms consume different power. Using SPA attacks, secret information, such as a secret
key or parts of it, can be inferred directly through visual inspection of power traces. Countermeasures
proposed for this attack are straight forward. DPA attacks involve higher order analysis of power
traces like statistical analysis [50]. Hence, solutions proposed to prevent SPA attacks cannot be directly
applied to prevent DPA attacks.
Various countermeasures have been proposed to prevent DPA attacks, varying in their degree of
protection. The key goal of countermeasures is to tune power traces to prevent information leakage.
Techniques, like insertion of dummy instructions to misalign power traces [16] and masking techniques
at the gate level [80], are proposed to counteract DPA. In [30, 46], it was shown that these techniques do
not effectively prevent DPA attacks. Other countermeasures like, masked dual-rail pre-charge logic [62]
and logic families whose power consumption is independent of processed data [78], have been proposed
to prevent DPA attacks. But the increased area, power, performance, and design time overheads limit
their adoptability. A countermeasure using a DVFS approach called RDVFS was proposed in [87],
which randomly selects voltage scaling and associated frequency. This technique is area and power
efficient. However, even with RDVFS, Baddam et. al. [7] were able to successfully compromise a
system. This is due to the one-to-one mapping between voltage and frequency of RDVFS (V, f ) pairs.
In RAKSHA, by using our basic building blocks, we propose to break this one-to-one relationship used
by current DVFS platforms. Such an approach does not involve algorithmic changes or require custom
design flows.
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CHAPTER 3. RELIABLE AND AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS
3.1 Reliable and Aggressive Framework
In this chapter, the design and operation details of reliable and aggressive system to understand the
rest of the thesis is presented. Timing speculation of aggressive systems allows data computed to be
used speculatively.To guage the perfomance enhancemnet of a processor, we have conducted a case
study by exploiting frequency swings offered by reliable and aggressive systems. This study results are
also presented in this chapter.
3.1.1 An opportunity for increasing performance
The clock frequency of a pipelined system is determined by the pipeline stage with the longest
critical path, under worst-case conditions. Traditional design methodologies are too conservative, as
the conditions that produce worst-case delays rarely occur in tandem. Moreover, circuit delay has a
strong association with the data being processed and hence, not all inputs of a task cause its worst-case
delay. For instance, in a carry-propagate adder, the worst-case delay occurs only when the carry is
propagated through each bit-slice, which occurs only for specific inputs [4]. The infrequent occurrence
of critical timing delays has opened a new domain of study for increasing system performance by using
timing speculation at the circuit level. Operating a system faster than worst-case allows us to exploit
data dependent circuit delay variance and execute more efficiently.
The main concern with working at frequencies past the worst-case limit is that timing errors may
occur. In order to reliably take advantage of performance improvements, the system must be made
tolerant to these potential timing errors. Aggressive, but reliable, design methodologies employ timing
error detection and recovery schemes to prevent erroneous data from propagating throughout the system
[25, 9, 73, 10].
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Figure 3.1 (a) Conceptual LFDR circuit to enable reliable overclocking (b) De-
signing a pipeline using LFDR (c) Illustration of aggressive clocking
with worst case delay
3.1.2 Reliable overclocking mechanism
Adaptive and reliable overclocking approach uses circuitry placed between pipeline stages to lo-
cally detect and recover from timing errors [9, 73, 10]. The conceptual circuit element, Local Fault
Detection and Recovery (LFDR), is shown in Figure 3.1(a). It consists of two registers, Main and
Backup, clocked by clock signals CLK1 and CLK2 respectively. DataIn represents data coming from
the combinational logic and DataOut represents the latched data that is sent to the next stages of compu-
tation. Both CLK1 and CLK2 have the same frequency at all times, but are phase shifted. Figure 3.1(b)
explains how LFDR circuit is used in a pipeline. Figure 3.1(c) shows the timing relationship between
the clock signals CLK1 and CLK2 with respect to the worst-case clock period. The contamination delay
TCD is the minimum amount of time between when the input to a logic circuit changes and the time
when its output begins to change. The amount of phase shift is such that the time delay from the first
rising edge of CLK1 to the second rising edge of CLK2 is not less than the maximum propagation delay
of the circuit.
Two points to be noted are - 1) Computation that begins at the first rising edge of CLK1 will produce
a correct result by the second rising edge of CLK2; and 2) If the input of the combinational circuit
changes at the first rising edge of CLK1, then the output of the combinational circuit will not change
until the first rising edge of CLK2. Thus Backup register always latches the correct value. It is also
important to note that the extent of overclocking is limited by TCD.
When data latched in the Main register and the Backup register do not match, a local error signal
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Parameter Value
Fetch/Decode/Issue/Commit width 4 inst/cycle
Functional units 4 INT ALUs, 1 INT
MUL/DIV, 4 FP ALUs,
1 FP MUL/DIV
L1 D-cache 128K
L1 I-cache 512K
L2 Unified 1024K
Technology node 45nm
Base frequency 2.5GHz
No. of freq levels 32
Freq sampling 10µs
Freq penalty 0µs (Assuming Dual PLL)
Table 3.1 Simulator Parameters
is raised. A local recovery measure is then initiated by loading the value stored in Backup into Main
during the next cycle. Load E represents the control signal that is used to recover from timing error
scenarios. In a pipelined system, a global error signal also is raised, as shown in Figure 3.1(b). All
pipeline stages preceding this stage are stalled for a cycle, while all the stages following this stage
process a bubble. Limiting the timing error budget to a reasonable number, SPRIT3E has shown to
enhance performance by up to 57% [73].
3.2 Performance Analysis
As the system is aggressively constrained, timing error rate can increase and can nullify any possi-
ble performance enhancement. Timings error rate introduce an upper bound for the possible frequency
swings. To guage the frequency swings that are possible beyoond the traditional worst-case estimate,
we have conducted a case study and results of the study are presented below.
3.2.1 Error rate characterization
To study the behavior of timing errors, we have conducted a simple study on Alpha processor
model. Entire experiment framework has been developed as a part of our ongoing research efforts. We
ran selected set of SPEC 2000 benchmark workloads on SimpleScalar - a cycle accurate simulator [17].
In order to embed timing aspects in SimpleScalar, we examined a hardware model of Alpha processor
and obtained the number of timing errors occurring at different clock period, for each workload. We
synthesized Illinois Verilog Model (IVM) for Alpha 21264 configuration using 45nm OSU standard cell
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Figure 3.2 Cumulative error rate at different clock periods for the IVM Alpha
processor executing instructions from SPEC 2000 benchmarks
library [72]. To match the RTL model, we adopt the same configuration for SimpleScalar simulations
as well and the details of the simulation settings are presented in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.2 presents he cumulative error rate of six SPEC 2000 workloads for 32 equal intervals, for
worst-case delay of 7ns and minimum contamination delay of 3.5ns. The error profile obtained is the
average values obtained by running the experiment for 100,000 cycles, and repeating the experiment
with different sequences of 100,000 instructions for each workload. Although we are aware of the
fact that the hardware configuration of the IVM pipeline is simplistic, we only use the study results to
provide insights on timing error profile of a single core designed using reliable and aggressive design
methodology.
As we notice from Figure 3.2, onset of timing errors doesn’t begin until clock perios is 5.5ns. It is
resultant of the conservative guard band set for the system top operate at worst-case scenarios. Timing
error profile presented can be divided into two regions, A and B. In region A, we see only moderate
increase in timing error rate with frequency and in region B, we see an exponential increase in timing
error rate. All applications have an error rate less than 5% in region A. In this region, clock frequency
has been scaled up from 7ns to 3.9ns, This translates into 79% increase in clock frequency for a 5%
timing error rate. But for more complex processors such high frequency swings may not possible.
18
Recent trends show deeper integration of DVFS with increase in available voltage and frequencies
[65]. It should be noted that increase in available voltages and frequencies are still estimated for worst-
case scenarios. With this trend, distance between any two frequencies of (V, f ) pair spectrum is less
than 20-30% [28]. Therefore, for processors with high timing error rates, dynamic frequency swing
should be limited to 20-30% of worst case clock frequency (region A).
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CHAPTER 4. HIGH INTEGRITY TECHNIQUES
4.1 Introduction
Nano-sized transistors, coupled with deployment in hazardous environments, have magnified the
reliability concerns plaguing modern computing systems. Rapid enhancements in VLSI technology
have fueled the increasing apprehension of system hardware being susceptible to myriad of faults.
Many fault tolerance techniques are proposed at different levels of design hierarchy, starting from the
design of hardened latches to system-level fault tolerant architectures [1, 3, 29, 49]. All these techniques
strive to provide high degrees of fault coverage by providing redundancy in either information, spatial or
temporal domains. For example, on-chip memories, which are regularly structured arrays, are protected
by Error Correcting Codes (ECC) against transient bit-flips, also known as, soft errors [20]. ECC
applies information redundancy to mitigate soft errors, while incurring resource overhead, in terms of
area and power.
In the past, single event upsets (SEUs) were a major concern in space applications creating hard
threats like loss of control, which often lead to catastrophic system failures. An SEU is caused when a
high energy particle, either from cosmic radiation or decaying radioactive material, strikes the silicon
substrate. If enough charge is deposited by the strike, it causes a bit flip in the memory cell or a
transient pulse in the combinational logic. The latter is referred to as a Single Event Transient (SET).
A report by NASA, in September 2009, indicates that cosmic ray intensities have increased 19% above
the previous space-age highs [58]. Study conducted by Normand in [60], provide recent evidence of
upsets at ground level, which implies, terrestrial applications also require fault tolerant techniques to
ensure their dependability.
With shrinking transistor feature sizes, supply voltages and node capacitance’s of the circuits are
getting smaller and smaller. However, this lowers the energy threshold needed by high-energy particles
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to induce errors. It results in rapid increase in number of particles in the flux that can induce a soft error.
As indicated in [70], the problem of soft errors in combinational circuits is becoming comparable to
that of unprotected memory elements in current and future technologies. Radiation induced SET pulses
have widths in the range of 500ps to 900ps in the 90nm process, as compared to 400ps to 700ps in the
130nm process [56].
Providing fault tolerance capabilities for random and complex logic is expensive, both in terms of
area and power. Techniques such as, duplication and comparison, and temporal triple modular redun-
dancy (TMR) and majority voting have been proposed to mitigate soft error rate in logic circuits [48].
These approaches pay penalty for false errors and incur performance overhead even during error-free
operation. Also at this juncture, when static power is comparable to dynamic power, logic replication
is not a viable alternative.
Increasing system wide integration force designers to adopt worst-case design methodologies,
while designing individual system components. With such design practices, safety margins are added
to address parameter variations, which include intra-die and inter-die process variations, and environ-
mental variations, which include temperature and voltage variations [13, 14]. These additional guard
bands are becoming non-negligible in nanometer technologies. Designers conservatively add these
safety margins to salvage chips from timing failures and shortened lifetime. Most systems are charac-
terized to operate safely below a particular vendor specified frequency. When they are operated beyond
this rated frequency, timing errors and system failure may happen.
Overclocking as a means to improve performance is a popular technique among enthusiasts [24].
Microprocessor vendors are even introducing capabilities in the chipset, examples being AMD’s Over-
drive and Advanced Clock Calibration techniques, to support overclocking. The latest 45nm AMD
Phenom II processor has been overclocked to upwards of 5GHz from its rated frequency of 2.8GHz,
using liquid nitrogen cooling [85]. Frequency binning and discreteness in artifact grading are con-
tributing to this improvement in performance through overclocking. Also, circuits exhibit worst case
delay only when their longest delay paths are sensitized by the inputs. However, these worst case delay
inducing inputs and operating conditions are rare, leading to room for performance improvement that
overclockers exploit [4]. The problem is that timing errors may occur at overclocked speeds, so in order
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to reliably take advantage of this improvement in execution time, the processor must be made in some
way tolerant to errors.
Overclocking without guaranteeing functional correctness leads to unpredictable system behavior
and loss of data. Aggressive, but reliable, design methodologies employ relevant timing error detection
and recovery schemes to prevent erroneous data from being used [25, 27]. In [9, 73], it has been
shown that operating frequency can be increased beyond worst case limit, allowing systems to operate
at optimal clock frequency, by adapting to the current set of instructions and environmental conditions.
Performance gains as high as 50% was achieved for a small recoverable error rate of 1%.
Safety critical systems with hard real-time constraints require wide fault coverage with no compro-
mise in performance. An interesting capability in nanometer design space, we believe, is to provide
soft error tolerant reliable execution for high performance aggressive designs. In this chapter, we pro-
pose new ways of designing fault tolerant and reliably overclocked register cells that enable systems to
improve both their performance and dependability.
4.1.1 Chapter Contributions
In this chapter, we address the issue of soft errors in random logic and develop solutions that provide
fault tolerance capabilities. For this, we consider the approach of multiple clocking of data for detecting
and correcting soft errors in combinational logic, an approach widely used in [3, 48, 59, 52, 23, 66].
Our first technique, SEM, replaces register elements in a circuit with Soft Error Mitigation (SEM)
register cells. It allows systems to operate without the overhead of soft error detection circuitry. Unlike
earlier approaches proposed using dual modular redundancy in space/time (DMR) and triple modular
redundancy in time (TMR), SEM technique differs in error detection and recovery process and doesn’t
incur any performance penalty during error-free operation. SEM completes error detection process with
two comparisons and also pays no penalty for false errors. Also on error detection, SEM avoids re-
computation and recovers using local recovery. Our second technique, STEM, concurrently detects and
corrects soft and timing errors using Soft and Timing Error Mitigation (STEM) register cells. STEM
cells have soft error mitigation capabilities comparable to those of SEM cells, and they also support
reliable overclocking. Both of our techniques employ a distributed and temporal voting scheme that
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enables in-situ error detection and fast recovery. We support circuit level speculation in both SEM
and STEM techniques. We allow data to move forward speculatively, and when an error happens we
void the computation and perform re-computation. Since systems are protected from timing errors that
may happen when systems are clocked aggressively, STEM approach allows systems to operate beyond
design margins by providing support for reliable dynamic overclocking. Developed from better-than-
worst-case design methodologies, dynamic overclocking exploits input data dependencies permitting
the clock frequency to increase beyond the critical path delays and allowing systems to operate at
optimal clock frequency [9, 73].
For error detection and correction, our temporal data sampling mechanisms, sample data at three
different time intervals and thus require three clocks for proper operation. Clock distribution and rout-
ing are significant challenges in nano-scale technologies. Clock distribution network (CDN) consumes
a significant portion of the power, area and metal resources in an integrated circuit. As a consequence,
a specialized clock generation, distribution and routing scheme that minimizes the clock distribution
overhead incurred by our fault mitigation techniques is important. Also, to support reliable dynamic
overclocking, as discussed in [9, 73], it is important to precisely control the relative phase shifts of
clock signals at high frequencies. Therefore, we focus on developing an efficient local clock manager
(LCM), which helps in generating the required clock signals, with the desired phase shifts, locally. The
clocks, so generated and distributed, satisfy the timing constraints required for proper working of our
techniques. We also analyze the area overhead incurred for developing such LCMs.
For our experimental study, we integrated our data sampling mechanisms into a two stage pipeline
consisting of an adder and a multiplier. Our results show that, with STEM cells, performance of this
system can be increased by 55.93% over conventional TMR schemes, while providing near 100%
fault coverage. For the experiments conducted on a DLX processor, we observed that SEM technique
achieves an average performance improvement of 26.58% over the TMR scheme and STEM outper-
forms SEM by 27.42%, while providing near 100% fault coverage.
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4.1.2 Chapter Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe our soft error
mitigation technique and recovery mechanism. Section 4.3 describes how both timing error and soft
error are concurrently detected and corrected. In Section 4.4, we discuss the issues in designing a
pipeline system with our proposed soft/timing error mitigation techniques. Section 4.5 discusses the
design aspects and area overheads of implementing a local clock manager. We present our results in
Section 4.6 and related work in Section 4.7.
4.2 Soft Error Mitigation For High Performance
4.2.1 Problem of false errors
To combat the problem of soft errors, spatial redundancy or time redundancy or both have been
used in previously proposed solutions [48]. Dual Modular Redundant (DMR) systems employ two
components to detect soft errors and the error recovery process is triggered whenever the comparison
between these two components fails. There is an error in the system only if the primary component
has an error and not in the redundant component. If we assume, probability for any component (out of
the two components) to fail is equally likely, then the false error rate is as high as 50%. This can make
systems to pay a huge penalty in the form of performance and power during the error recovery process.
This penalty is aggravated in TMR systems as the false error rate can shoot up to 66%. Moreover,
voting process degrades system performance. So an ideal situation would be to reduce power and
performance penalty by lowering the false error rate or completely avoiding them. With SEM cell
design, we explain how the problem of false errors or false positives is avoided with the redundancy
organization associated with systems employing them.
4.2.2 SEM cell Design
Prior soft error mitigation techniques at the circuit level are either based on temporal redundancy,
spatial redundancy or a combination of both. These techniques achieve high degree of fault coverage,
whilst degrading or trading performance, silicon area and other resources. For example, in [48], a spe-
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cific design of a voting mechanism based on temporal triple modular redundancy is discussed, which
mitigates all single event upsets. However, the overhead incurred is very high, as the operating fre-
quency of a system built with such fault mitigation scheme must include the delays of combinational
logic blocks, phase shifts of the clocks and the delay incurred by the voter. In this section, we present a
variant of this scheme, and show that with a combination of local and global recovery, we can remove
the additional overhead imposed, by the fault mitigation scheme, on the system operating frequency.
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Figure 4.1 SEM Cell to Mitigate Soft Eerrors
The intent of our scheme is to make systems operate at frequencies same as that of non-fault tolerant
designs, by unloading the error detection overhead from the circuit worst-case timing delay estimation.
To keep the overhead of error detection off the critical path, we present the following redundancy orga-
nization using our Soft Error Mitigation (SEM) cells. Figure 4.1(a) shows a gate-level embodiment of a
SEM cell. It consists of three registers R1, R2 and R3, clocked by clock signals CLK1, CLK2 and CLK3,
respectively. DataIn represents data coming from the combinational logic and DataOut represents the
latched data that is sent to the next stages of computation. Error and Benign represents the control
signals generated by the voting process that help in soft error detection and recovery. Load Backup
represents the control signal that is used to recover from soft error scenarios. Data is sampled at three
different time intervals T1, T2 and T3, and are stored in registers R1, R2 and R3, respectively.
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4.2.3 Timing Constraints
Figure 4.2 shows the timing relationship between the clock signals and the data sampling intervals.
Clock signals, CLK1, CLK2 and CLK3, have the same frequency, but they are out-of-phase by an amount
governed by the timing constraints, explained below. Data is stored in registers at the rising edge of the
clock signals, and strict timing constraints are required for efficient mitigation of soft errors. Notations
that are used to explain the timing requirements are listed below. Contamination delay is the minimum
amount of time beginning from when the input to logic becomes stable and valid to the time that the
output of that logic begins to change. Propagation delay refers to the maximum delay of the circuit,
under worst case conditions.
• TCD = Contamination delay of the logic circuit
• TPD = Propagation delay of the logic circuit
• TPW = Expected soft error/noise pulse width
• Φ1 = Phase shift between CLK1 and CLK2
• Φ2 = Phase shift between CLK2 and CLK3
• T = Clock period
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) ensure that registers R1, R2 and R3 are not corrupted by the same soft
error. Since the system is running at CLK1 frequency, data is forwarded speculatively to subsequent
stages after latching in register R1, and subsequent stages start their computation immediately.
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Φ1 = T2−T1 ≥ TPW (4.1)
Φ2 = T3−T2 ≥ TPW (4.2)
Short paths present in the combinational circuit may corrupt the data before it gets latched in reg-
isters R2 and R3. Consequently, it is required to constrain short paths so that the same data registered
in R1 is also latched in registers R2 and R3, during error-free operation. Equation (4.3) ensure that
these constraints are met, enabling timing speculation, by increasing the contamination delay above
the desired combined phase shift values, given by Φ1 and Φ2. Equation (4.4) makes sure that tempo-
ral sampling happens only after the computation by the combinational logic is done. Our technique
is capable of detecting all SEUs happening on registers, and all SETs having pulse duration less than
TPW .
TCD ≥Φ1 +Φ2 (4.3)
T ≥ TPD (4.4)
4.2.4 Soft Error Detection and Recovery
Table 4.1 presents the possible soft error scenarios that a SEM technique is capable of detecting
and recovering from. The table also lists the corresponding recovery mechanisms used. Once the data
is latched in registers R1, R2 and R3, they are compared with each other as shown in Figure 4.1(a) to
produce ERROR and BENIGN signals. This comparison operation completes the voting process required
to detect soft errors. On error detection, a single cycle system stall is all that is required for complete
recovery. Below, we explain the different possible scenarios and the recovery mechanism used when
an error happens.
• CASE I : No soft error occurs. Data latched in all three registers are correct. Both ERROR and
BENIGN signals stay low, and no recovery mechanism is triggered. System operation continues
without any interruption.
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• CASE II : A soft error corrupts the data latched in register R1. ERROR signal goes high after
the data is latched in R2. Since the next stage speculatively uses the data forwarded from R1, re-
computation is required next cycle to ensure functional correctness. The data stored in registers
R2 and R3 are unaffected by the soft error. During the next cycle, value stored in R2 or R3 is
loaded back into register R1 with the help of the control signal LBKUP, completing the local
recovery process. Figure 4.1 (a) shows R3 being loaded into R1. Global recovery, in the form
of a stall signal sent to all other SEM cells that are unaffected by the soft error, is initiated and
completed in one cycle.
• CASE III : A soft error corrupts the data latched in register R2. Both the signals, ERROR and
BENIGN, go high once temporal data sampling is completed. This is a false positive scenario.
No recovery is required as data forwarded to the next stage is correct. System operation is not
interrupted.
• CASE IV : This represents a case where register R3 is corrupted with a soft error. In this case
ERROR signal stays low, while BENIGN signal is asserted high. No recovery and interruption is
required in this case too, as BENIGN signal is high.
As can be seen, SEM does not trigger error recovery for false positive scenarios. Also, since the
data latched in R1 is speculatively used by the succeeding stages, as soon as it is available, the error
detection overhead is not incurred during normal system operation. This is also a low overhead solution,
as it shuns the need for check pointing at regular time intervals. Thus, we enable systems to mitigate
soft errors, using SEM cells, without any loss of performance, compared to a non-fault tolerant design.
Case R1 R2 R3 Error Benign Error Recovery
I
√ √ √
0 0 No recovery required
II × √ √ 1 0 Load R2 or R3 into R1
III
√ × √ 1 1 No recovery required
IV
√ √ × 0 1 No recovery required
Table 4.1 Possible Soft Error Scenarios of SEM Cell (
√
= No Error; × = Soft
Error)
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4.2.5 Fault Tolerance Analysis
The SEM technique detects and recovers from all possible soft error scenarios involving both SEUs
and SETs. This scheme is well suited for fast transient pulses. Since fast transients typically correspond
to soft errors with high strike rate probabilities, SEM cells have near 100% transient fault mitigation
capability. Our scheme offers protection for pulses of widths less than the phase shifts provided be-
tween the clock signals. Any noise signal, whose pulse width exceeds this limit, cannot be detected by
our scheme.
4.3 Soft Error Mitigation In Aggressive Designs
Aggressive designs are based on the philosophy that it is possible to go beyond worst-case limits
to achieve best performance by not avoiding, but detecting and correcting a modest number of timing
errors. Adaptive reliable overclocking technique proposed for synchronous implementation of logic
blocks acts like an asynchronous system design technique exploiting data-dependent variance in delay.
In this section, we further investigate the solution presented in previous section for soft error mitigation,
and explain how it can be modified for soft error mitigation in aggressive designs, which uses adaptive
reliable overclocking technique for improving system performance. Such a technique enables systems
to operate beyond safety margins, while preserving data integrity.
With a conventional voter design, to detect and correct n errors simultaneously, we need to have
up to 2n+ 1 data samples. In our case, we have n = 2, since we need to detect and correct both soft
and timing errors. For this analysis, we consider soft errors to be of only type SET. A traditional fault
tolerance technique requires five different data values for guaranteeing both soft error and timing error
detection and correction. The overhead incurred by this approach is very high as it increases the number
of registers by four times, and requires five different clocks to sample data at five different times. Our
goal is to develop a soft and timing error mitigation scheme that incurs minimal overhead. The proposed
Soft and Timing Error Mitigation (STEM) cell is similar to the SEM cell in area complexity. However,
the error detection and recovery mechanism is significantly different to address the requirements of
concurrent soft and timing error mitigation.
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Figure 4.3 STEM Cell to Mitigate Soft and Timing Errors
4.3.1 Error Detection
Figure 4.3 shows a gate-level embodiment of a STEM cell, which acts as an on-line-fault monitor
for soft and timing error mitigation. It also consists of three registers R1, R2 and R3, clocked by clock
signals CLK1, CLK2 and CLK3, respectively. DATAIN represents data coming from the combinational
logic and DATAOUT represents the latched data that is sent to the next stages of computation. ERROR
and PANIC represents the control signals generated by the voting process that help in soft error and
timing error detection and recovery. LBKUP and LPANIC represents the control signals that are used
to recover from error scenarios as presented in Table 4.2. Under no error scenarios, incoming data
is sampled at three different time intervals T1, T2 and T3, and are stored in registers R1, R2 and R3,
respectively.
The working of a STEM cell is as follows. Once the data is latched in registers R1 and R2, they
are compared with each other. This comparison operation completes the timing error detection process,
since R2 is timing safe [27, 9, 73]. But in the presence of soft errors, this comparison operation presents
an ambiguous situation, as it is not possible to distinguish which one of these two registers is corrupted
by an erroneous value. Also, value in R2 is not to be trusted during the error recovery process.
If the comparison between R1 and R2 flags a mismatch, register R3 is shielded from the incoming
data value, and its content is used to recover the system state. This is done because any soft error
that happens after comparing R1 and R2 has the potential to corrupt R3 and push the system into an
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unrecoverable state. Only when there is no mismatch between registers R1 and R2, register R3 is
allowed to latch the data safely. However, we have not yet ascertained whether R3 is free from soft
error. Therefore, we perform another comparison operation to complete the error detection process.
After register R3 is updated, we compare it with register R2, to detect any error happening in register
R3. If there is no mismatch, register R3 is trusted for error recovery purposes. If they mismatch, then
that represents a case where register R3 is corrupted by a soft error. At this point, it is possible to say
that data latched in registers R1 and R2 are uncorrupted. The system is stalled for one cycle for flushing
out the erroneous value from R3, and loading either R1 or R2 value into R3.
Case R1 R2 R3 ERROR PANIC RECOVERY
I NE NE NE 0 0 No recovery required
II SE NE NE 1 0 Load R3 into R1, R2
III NE SE NE 1 0 Load R3 into R1, R2
IV NE NE SE 0 1 Load R2 into R3
V TE NE NE 1 0 Load R3 into R1, R2
VI TE SE NE 1 0 Load R3 into R1, R2
Table 4.2 Possible Error Scenarios in using STEM Cell (NE = No Error; SE =
Soft Error; TE = Timing Error)
4.3.2 Timing Constraints
As is the case with SEM cells, STEM cells also require strict timing constraints, to detect and
correct soft and timing errors. STEM cells must satisfy Equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3). Equation (4.4)
is modified as shown in Equation (4.5) for STEM cells. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) ensures that registers
present in a STEM cell are not corrupted by the same SET. Equations (4.3) and (4.5) ensure that data
latched in registers R2 and R3 are timing correct, i.e. free from timing errors. The timing relationships
shown in Figure 4.2 still holds, with the caveat that Φ1 also includes the extent of overclocking that is
possible every cycle.
T +φ1 ≥ TPD (4.5)
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4.3.3 Error Recovery
Table 4.2 lists all possible error scenarios with corresponding recovery mechanisms. In the fol-
lowing discussion, we explain the various possible events that take place in the STEM cell, and the
associated recovery mechanism that is used in case of an error. It employs either a single cycle or three
cycle fast local recovery based on the values of ERROR and PANIC signals, shown in Figure 4.3.
• CASE I : No error case. Both signals, ERROR and PANIC, stay low. System operation is not
interrupted.
• CASE II, III, V, VI : This represents a case where one of the registers R1 or R2 is corrupted.
In this case, ERROR = 1 and PANIC = 0. In this scenario R3 is not updated, and the system
recovers by loading R3 in to R1 and R2 triggering re-computation. A three cycle global recovery
process is initiated, which includes: one cycle stall for loading data back into the registers R1 and
R2, using LBKUP signal, and two cycles for re-computation. This two cycle re-computation is
required, as the error might have occurred because of overclocking, and this error will repeat in
R1, if sufficient time is not given for re-computation. This prevents recurrent system failures.
• CASE IV : Only R3 is corrupted. In this case, ERROR = 0 and PANIC = 1. No re-computation is
required. However, it is necessary to flush the erroneous data from R3, to facilitate error recovery
in subsequent cycles. As data in only R3 is corrupted, “golden” data present in R2 is loaded in
to R3. This requires a single cycle system stall, during which all STEM cells perform a local
correction, using LPANIC signal.
4.3.4 Fault Tolerance Analysis
As is seen, the STEM technique detects and recovers from all possible soft and timing error scenar-
ios, wherein the soft error is only of type SET. Also, the case where ERROR = 1 and PANIC = 1 never
happens by design. Our technique leads to silent data corruption, if an SEU happens in R3. However,
since register R3 is only used as a checkpointing register, a corrupted R3 value may lead to failure, only
if an error occurs in R1 or R2 in the next cycle. Consequently, the possibility of a system failure because
of a SEU in R3 is heavily mitigated. For Case VI, we expect that a TE or SE affects several STEM
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cells, and the possibility of all cells having a TE in R1 and SE in R2 is insignificant. Hence, we hope
one of the STEM cells will have the error signal triggered, preventing R3 of all STEM cells from being
loaded. If ERROR = 1, then we do not look at PANIC signal. The fault coverage is similar to that of
the SEM technique, except that in case of false positives, we still need to take appropriate corrective
action. In case of the SEM scheme, this value will be overwritten, as R3 is used only for error detection.
However, the STEM technique allows reliable overclocking, achieving higher performance than those
systems incorporated with SEM cells.
4.4 Pipeline Design
The basic step in using SEM or STEM cells in a pipeline is to replace all pipeline registers with
either one of them. Input clocks are to be constrained in a way, so as to provide fault tolerance capa-
bilities to the pipeline from soft error, as well as, timing error when STEM is the cell of choice. In this
section, our discussion is based on the use of STEM cells in place of pipeline registers. Using SEM
cells follow straight forward.
Figure 4.4 illustrates how STEM cells are integrated into a processor pipeline. The figure depicts
the data and control flow for a five-stage pipeline processor. To the last stage of the pipeline, which
is writeback (WB), an extra write buffer, is added. This is to ensure that data written to the register
file or memory is always free from timing errors. Every pipeline stage register is replaced with STEM
cells, except for the write buffer registers. All error signals from a pipeline stage are logically OR-
ed to generate the stage error for that pipeline stage. Global error signal,GERROR, is generated from
all pipeline stage error signals, by combining them using another ”OR” function. Similarly, global
LPANIC signal is generated from individual PANIC signal from all STEM cells. Timing errors may
occur once the operating frequency exceeds the worst-case frequency estimate. As explained in the
previous section, our data latching scheme of STEM cell guarantees sufficient time before latching
values in registers R2 and R3. However, data latched in all three registers are susceptible to soft errors
that are uniformly distributed in time and space. Here, we explain the pipeline operation for ERROR = 1
and PANIC = 0 (Case II, III, V, VI), as this is the most complicated case. Once an error is detected in
any one of the pipeline stages, the global error signal is asserted, and in every stage of the pipeline,
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registers R3 of the STEM cells are not updated with the incoming data. In the next clock cycle, the
load backup signal, LBKUP, is asserted, and in each STEM cell, the content of register R3 is loaded
into corresponding R1 and R2 registers. After this, the clock to the pipeline is stalled for two cycles,
completing the error recovery process.
4.4.1 Clock Control
Clock control monitors the error rate of the pipeline and communicates this error rate information
with the clock generator for frequency tuning. Clock generator is connected to the pipeline in a feed-
back loop. It checks the pipeline error rate with a set target rate, which is programmable. Process of
generating new frequency takes up to 10us, depending upon the speed at which the phase locked loop
(PLL) generates the new stable clock signal. Depending on the clock control scheme and error rate
sampling scheme chosen [9, 73], clock frequency is adjusted to allow the pipeline to operate below a
set target error rate. Once the new clock is generated, the main clock signal, CLK, is switched to that
frequency and other clock signals CLK1G, CLK2G, CLK3G are generated by providing the necessary
phase shifts to CLK.
4.4.2 Dynamic Frequency Scaling
In the following discussion, we derive the limits of frequency scaling within which a system inte-
grated with STEM cells operates reliably. Pipeline starts execution with a minimal phase shift required
between the clocks, and the clock frequency is gradually increased, while satisfying the error rate
constraint, as shown in Figure 4.5 (a). To support reliable dynamic overclocking, certain governing
conditions need to be met at all times, during pipeline operation. Let us assume that the pipeline op-
erates reliably between the clock frequencies, FMIN and FMAX , governed by time periods, TMAX and
TMIN respectively. TMAX is estimated by the worst-case design settings, and is equal to worst-case
clock period, TWC. The following clocking constraints decide TMIN . Under overclocking conditions,
the following constraints must be satisfied for proper error detection and recovery.
Let D1 represent the phase shift that needs to be provided for CLK2, with respect to CLK1, for soft
and timing error mitigation, when the system is clocked with clock period TMIN , , as shown in Figure
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Figure 4.5 Dynamic Frequency Scaling
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4.5 (b). Let D2 represent the phase shift that needs to be provided for CLK3, with respect to CLK1, for
proper error recovery, when the system is clocked with clock period TMIN . Value of TMIN , satisfying
Equation (4.6), corresponds to the maximum frequency at which a system can possibly recover, after a
timing error occurs.
TMIN +D1 ≥ TPD (4.6)
D2−D1 ≥ TPW (4.7)
TCD ≥ D2 (4.8)
4.4.3 Fixed Frequency Operation
For operating without any run-time optimizations, the frequency of the main clock can be fixed
at the desirable operating frequency satisfying the conditions described in Section 4.3. This operating
frequency can also be set above the worst case estimate. Under these conditions, systems using STEM
cells will see varying error rates based on the executing application. This configuration offer perfor-
mance better than the system integrated with SEM cells and cannot achieve the best performance as
the dynamic frequency adjustment is not allowed. If the frequency is fixed at the worst-case operating
frequency, systems integrated with SEM and STEM cells are expected to offer quite high levels of re-
liability having identical performance levels, when compared to an unprotected system, as there is no
overhead incorporated by error detection and correction circuitry on system operating frequency.
4.4.4 Pipeline Error Recovery
In this section, we present the error recovery scheme in detail for a pipeline using STEM cells. Var-
ious events involved in the recovery process are illustared with the help of a timing diagram. Figure 4.6
shows how our global error recovery scheme rescues a system when an error happens in the pipeline.
The figure also depicts the timing relationship between various control signals required for the recovery
process. The following description explains the events that take place during the recovery process for
the cases : ERROR = 1, PANIC = 0 and ERROR = 0,PANIC = 1.
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Figure 4.6 shows a set of clock signals, CLK1G, CLK2G and CLK3G, that are generated from the
main clock signal, CLK, using a LCM. Next, it shows a set of clock signals, CLK1P, CLK2P and CLK3P,
that are routed to the pipeline. These clock signals, which are gated versions of CLK1G, CLK2G and
CLK3G respectively, are stalled in a manner that enables the pipeline to recover from different error
scenarios. Signal ERRORN indicates an error happening in the pipeline stage N. ERROR signals from
all the pipeline stages are OR-ed together to generate the global error signal, GERROR, which is latched
in the clock control unit. Similarly, to initiate global recovery when ERROR = 0,PANIC = 1 i.e. for
panic cases, all stage PANIC signals are used.
For case, ERROR = 1, PANIC = 0, once an error is detected, the very next clock edge of clock
signal CLK3G is gated and in the next cycle, LBKUP signal is asserted high for one clock cycle. In the
same clock cycle, using CLK1P and CLK2P, recovery data from register R3 is loaded back into registers
R1 and R2. During the next cycle, all clock signals, CLK1G, CLK2G and CLK3G, are clock gated to
give the pipeline sufficient time for re-computation. Clock gating is achieved through control signals
CLKSTALL12 and CLKSTALL3, which are generated by the clock control unit.
For case, ERROR = 0, PANIC = 1, once an error is detected, the very next clock edge of clock
signals, CLK1G and CLK2G, is gated and in the same cycle, LPANIC signal is asserted high for one
clock cycle. Also, recovery data present in register R2 or R1 is loaded back into register R3 during
this cycle using CLK3P. Clock gating of clock signals, CLK1G and CLK2G is achieved through control
signal CLKSTALL12, which are generated by the clock control unit.
To illustrate our error recovery mechanism, error occurrences corresponding to cases, ERROR =
1,PANIC = 0 and ERROR = 0,PANIC = 1, are highlighted in Cycle 3 and Cycle 8 respectively. First
error occurs during the execution of INST 1 of pipeline stage N. This event triggers the error recovery
mechanism that spans from Cycle 4 to Cycle 6. During Cycle 4, data is loaded into register R1 and R2
from the corresponding stage golden register R3. Pipeline is allowed to perform the computation during
Cycles 5 and 6. Results are again checked at the end of Cycle 6. Since no error is detected in this cycle,
normal pipeline operation resumes. From the waveforms, we can see that on error detection, the entire
pipeline goes back by one instruction. Second error occurs during the execution of INST 3 of pipeline
stage N. This event triggers the error recovery mechanism that spans from Cycle 9 to Cycle 10. During
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Cycle 9, data is loaded into register R3 from the corresponding stage golden registers, R1 or R2. At
the end of Cycle 9, no new results are stored in all stage registers R1 and R2. New results are latched
and checked at the end of Cycle 10. Since no error is detected in this cycle, normal pipeline operation
resumes. In this case, the pipeline does not roll back and just the corresponding stage R3 register is
updated. As we can see from Figure 4.6, for 12 clock cycles, pipeline computes only 8 instructions as
4 clock cycles are accounted for the error recovery process.
4.4.5 Performance Analysis
A key factor that limits frequency scaling is error rate. As frequency is scaled higher, the number
of input combinations that result in delays greater than the new clock period also increases. The impact
of error rate on frequency scaling is analyzed as follows:
Let twc denote the worst-case clock period. Let tov denote the clock period after overclocking the
circuit. Let n be the number of cycles needed to recover from an error. Let us assume that a particular
application takes N clock cycles to execute, under normal conditions. Let tdi f f be the time difference
between the original clock period and the new clock period. Then the total execution time is reduced
by tdi f f ×N, if there is no error. Let us assume that the application runs at the overclocked frequency
of period tov with an error rate of k%. To achieve any performance improvement at this frequency,
Equation (4.9) must be satisfied. It states that even after accounting for error recovery penalty, execution
time required is still less than that required for worst-case frequency operation.
N× tov +n×N× k× tov < N× twc (4.9)
k <
(twc− tov)
n× tov (4.10)
For the STEM technique, an error can happen in five different scenarios, as mentioned in Table 4.2,
and also the error recovery penalty paid is not the same for all the cases. If we assume that all these error
scenarios are equally likely, then the average error penalty in cycles is: n = 4×3+1×15 = 2.6. According
to Equation (4.10), for a frequency increase of 15%, the error rate must not be higher than 5.76%, for
the STEM technique to yield no performance improvement. For error rates less than 1%, a frequency
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increase of 2.6% is enough for the STEM scheme to have a performance improvement over non fault
tolerant designs.
4.4.6 Impact of Process Variation
Process variation can alter gate delays of a combinational circuit and hence can alter the distribution
of path delays. Both our techniques, SEM and STEM, sample data at three different times, namely T1,
T2, and T3, after the computation is completed. Paths that can affect this sampling window are short
paths that are present in the circuit. These paths are already padded with buffers to allow sufficient
time for data sampling. In presence of process variation, in particular, only sampling interval T3 can
be affected. Since, these paths are present locally, inter-die variation has no impact on these paths. To
mitigate intra-die variation, conservative padding of buffers needs to be done on the short paths to make
sure that same data is sampled. This will only result in slight increase of the circuit area.
4.4.7 Overheads
One of the main overheads incurred by our schemes is fixing the circuit contamination delay to
a required value. Increasing this delay involves rapid increase in silicon area, as buffers need to be
inserted in the short circuit delay paths. This problem has to be addressed from different design per-
spectives that include developing new synthesis algorithms and delay buffer design with minimal area
consumption. Both SEM and STEM cells require metastability mitigation circuits, as flip-flops may
enter a metastable state when overclocked, or when a soft error reaches the registers during the latching
window. We envisage the incorporation of a metastability detection circuit, similar to the one developed
in [27].
4.5 Local Clock Management
Reliable dynamic overclocking technique has been proposed earlier, in [9, 73], to improve sys-
tem performance by tuning the clock frequency beyond the conservative worst-case clock period. It
requires a dynamic phase shift (DPS) between the clock signals to support aggressive dynamic clock
tuning. This implies the system has to be stalled for a few cycles whenever the clock frequency is
41
changed. This is done for two purposes: 1) the time needed to switch to a new frequency and 2) to ap-
propriately phase shift for the respective clock signals, as mandated by the timing constraints. At higher
frequencies, controlling the phase shift precisely is a challenge and often the phase shift step size can
restrict the possible system operating frequencies. Also, SEM and STEM cells would require three
clock distribution networks (CDN), thus increasing clock routing complexity and resources needed
for it. The increase in clock resources would in turn increase system energy consumption. To avoid
dynamic phase shift between the clock signals, we incorporate a constant phase shift (CPS) between
the clocks that are configured to run between frequencies corresponding to the time periods, TMAX and
TMIN .
Let us consider a case where TMAX = 10ns, TMIN = 6ns and TCD = 4ns. Considering a dynamic
phase shift between the clock signals, when we scale the system clock period down to 8ns, then we
need to provide a phase shift of 2ns. Similarly a phase shift of 3ns is required for a 7ns clock period.
Since the circuit contamination delay is increased to 4ns to aggressively clock the system, computed
data will remain stable for (T +4)ns, where T is the current operating frequency of the system. Instead
of requiring a dynamic phase shift along with frequency scaling, we provide a constant phase shift of
at most TCD at all times.
With a CPS scheme, aggressive systems can be built with a single CDN, thus tremendously reduc-
ing the amount of clock resources required. Using a constant phase shift that is valid for all frequencies
between FMIN to FMAX , allows phase management to be decoupled from frequency switching. This
completely eliminates the constraint imposed by the phase shift step size in DPS, allowing CPS to
support more operating configurations than DPS. Local clock managers (LCM) handle the phase shift
management in CPS. Figure 4.7 shows a conceptual implementation of a LCM that can distribute CLK1,
CLK2, and CLK3. Employing CPS, delay values D1 and D2, are set to constant values to satisfy the
timing constraint explained earlier in Section 4.4. Figure 4.7 also depicts how these LCMs could be
integrated into an H-tree clock distribution network.
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Figure 4.7 Local Clock Phase Management with Single Clock Routing
4.5.1 Case Study: Local Clock Management using buffers.
For generating clock signals required by SEM and STEM schemes locally, we present a possible
implementation using buffers. We perform this study using 45nm spice models distributed by Nangate
Technologies [55]. Post layout spice models containing parasitic information are used. Area over-
head, incurred for generating constant phase shift clocks, is analyzed by applying a load of 128 STEM
cells. From this study, we observe that, even for a 2.5ns phase shift, only 14 clock buffers are needed.
This overhead is much lower than a having a second and third clock tree networks. Study results are
summarized in Table 4.3.
DELAY(ns) BUFFERS DELAY(ns) BUFFERS
1.0 6 1.5 8
2 11 2.5 14
Table 4.3 Number of Buffers vs Delay
Figure 4.8 shows the transient response of clock signals generated with a LCM designed with delay
buffers. A load of 32 STEM cells is applied at room temperature (25◦C). From this we notice that,
sufficient phase shift between the clock signals is provided across all the cycles. Also the rise time and
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the fall time of CLK2 and CLK3 signals are around 569ps and 222ps respectively, as illustrated in the
Figure 4.8. Table 4.4 shows the rise time and the fall time for LCM outputs at different temperatures.
From these values, we notice that, all the clock signals track each other very well in terms of fall time
even at very high temperatures. They can also be made to have similar characteristics in terms of rise
time at the expense of designing sophisticated buffers.
OUTPUT 70◦C 75◦C 80◦C
risetime falltime risetime falltime risetime falltime
CLK1 200ps 200ps 200ps 200ps 200ps 200ps
CLK2 875ps 285ps 913ps 292ps 956ps 300ps
CLK3 861ps 278ps 898ps 286ps 935ps 293ps
Table 4.4 Temperature Effects on LCM Outputs
-0.2
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  5e-09  1e-08  1.5e-08  2e-08  2.5e-08  3e-08
Vo
lta
ge
 (V
)
Times (s)
LCM Outputs
CLK_1
CLK_2
CLK_3
Figure 4.8 Transient Response of LCM Outputs
Impact of process variations : In this case study, we presented a simple approach, using delay buffers
for managing phase relationship between clock signals that are required for SEM and STEM cells. It
is presented to give a conceptual picture of our CPS scheme. In presence of process variations, delay
of these buffer cells can vary and hence the phase difference between the clocks can also be altered. In
a CPS scheme, it is important to realize the difference in phase difference requirements between CLK1
and CLK2, and CLK2 and CLK3. In CPS, the phase difference between CLK1 and CLK2 at max needs
to be D1 (where D1  TPW ) and for CLK2 and CLK3, it has to be at least TPW . Because of process
variations, any variation in D1 will alter only limit the frequency scaling limits and not the soft error
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mitigation capabilities of our techniques. For CLK2 and CLK3 phase relationship, post fabrication delay
tuning approaches [57] or using tunable/programmable delay elements [38] can be used to mitigate the
effect of process variation (intra-die only) on our techniques.
4.6 Experiments and Results
In this section, we present our results based on the experiments conducted on a two stage arithmetic
pipeline and a five stage DLX in-order pipeline processor, wherein pipeline registers are augmented
with our fault detection and correction circuitry. It should be pointed out that soft error rate depends
on electrical masking and logical masking which inherently masks transient faults. Across process
technology nodes, logical masking remains the same but the electrical masking differs. This is because
electrical properties of gates differ between technology nodes. Electrical masking could diminish sig-
nificantly as feature size decreases. In order to model electrical masking that happens in nanometer
technologies, we have implemented system in 45nm technology. Also fault mitigation capabilities ex-
hibited for same T/TPW ratio but for different clock frequencies and pulse widths are expected to be
same. For example, fault mitigation capabilities exhibited for 100ps pulse at 1GHz are expected to be
the same as those offered for 1000ps pulse at 100MHz. As presented in Section 1, soft error pulses
have width in the range of 500ps−900ps in the 90nm process. In our experiments, we have considered
this extreme-case pulse width for 45nm process to demonstrate transient fault detection and correction
capabilities of our techniques. Without lose of generality, our results can be improved by relaxing the
soft error pulse width (TPW ) constraint and insights derived from our experiments will still hold.
4.6.1 Experimental Methodology
To estimate the performance gains and fault tolerant capabilities offered by SEM and STEM tech-
niques, simulations are carried out on a two stage arithmetic pipeline. This circuit performs a 64-bit
addition in the first stage and a 32-bit multiplication in the second stage. Adder output is fed to the
multiplier as multiplicand and multiplier. RTL level models are developed for both the circuits, and
are synthesized using the 45nm OSU standard cell library [72]. Timing-annotated gate level simula-
tions are then carried out by extracting timing information in standard delay format (SDF), and back
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annotating them on the design.
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Figure 4.9 Fault Injector Framework
Figure 4.9 illustrates our fault injection methodology. The working of our fault injector is as fol-
lows: A total of 2N (N being 7 in our experiments) fault injection test nodes that are spread uniformly
across the area of the logic circuit are selected. To make sure that our injected fault has indeed produced
a SET, we modified the circuit netlist to insert XOR gates at all selected nodes, as shown in Figure 4.9.
If a location i is chosen for fault injection, In jecti is made high to invert the signal A driven by the fault
injection node i. Out of 2N locations, one location is chosen randomly for fault injection at a time, by
using the output of a N-bit random number generator. For our experiments, we used a linear feedback
shift register (LFSR) for generating the N-bit random number. Final fault location is then selected with
the help of a N:2N decoder.
4.6.2 Results for Arithmetic Pipeline
For the arithmetic pipeline, from static timing analysis reports, we estimated the value of TMAX to be
9ns. For aggressively clocking the design, we increased the contamination delay to 3ns. Combinational
area of the arithmetic pipeline is increased by 38%, for fixing the contamination delay to 3ns. This area
overhead is in addition to the area consumed by SEM/STEM cells. Pulses of varying widths ranging
from 500ps to 900ps are injected in the unit under test (UUT). Each cycle, results are checked for
correctness after the computation is over to ensure that the recovery mechanism works. Whenever
recovery is triggered, we logged the occurrence of an error.
For evaluating STEM technique, we performed our experiments for a set error rate target of 1%
over 10000 cycles. During run time, the number of errors that happened during a sampling interval
is communicated to the clock controlling unit at the end of each interval. The clock controlling unit
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makes a decision based on the error rate, during the previous sampling interval, and the set target error
rate. We considered a linear control scheme for switching clock frequency between the worst-case
clock frequency, FMIN and the overclocked frequency, FMAX . For our design, TMIN is set at 7ns. This
range is divided into 32 steps, and if the error rate is less than 1%, clock frequency is increased by one
step size, otherwise it is decreased. Our fault injection results for the arithmetic pipeline are presented
in Table 4.5. We initialized the LFSR with different seeds, and the fault injection results are presented
for three different runs.
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Figure 4.10 Normalized Arithmetic Pipeline Execution Time
We configured the arithmetic pipeline designed with STEM cells to operate in three different
modes. They are no overclocking (NOOC), wherein TMAX = TMIN = 9ns, maximum overclocking
(MAXOC), wherein TMAX = TMIN = 7ns, and dynamic overclocking (DYNOC), wherein TMAX = 9ns
and TMIN = 7ns. For DYNOC mode, we started with a low frequency setting. For TMR system, worst-
case frequency, TMAX , is set at 11ns. We evaluate SEM scheme at a constant clock period of 9ns.
Performance improvements offered by both SEM scheme and different modes of STEM are shown in
Figure 4.10. From this, we can see that DYNOC mode offers 49% improvement over TMR, while
MAXOC mode offers 55% improvement. Performance of NOOC mode is comparable to that of SEM
and SEM offers 23% performance improvement over TMR. From Table 4.5, we can see that fault
masking rate is high in TMR design when compared with SEM and STEM designs. This is because; its
operating frequency includes the phase shifts of the clocks and voter delay. Hence, TMR operates with
a longer clock period compared to SEM and STEM, resulting in more SET pulses attenuating before
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reaching the latching window.
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Figure 4.11 Dynamic Frequency Scaling
Figure 4.11 shows the transient response of our arithmetic pipeline configured with STEM cells
in DYNOC mode. It shows how the frequency of the system changes dynamically for high to low
frequency switching mode and low to high frequency switching mode. From figure, we see that the
system tunes it optimal clock period to 7.2ns. For high to low frequency switching mode, the optimal
value is reached after 4 sampling intervals, for low to high mode, optimal value is reached after 22 such
intervals. High to low frequency mode ran more operations than the other mode, and the performance
difference was about 3%. Even though contamination of the system is increased to 3ns, the available
dynamic frequency range is restricted to 2ns due to pulse width considerations.
4.6.3 Results for DLX Processor
We also simulated three different micro benchmarks to evaluate the performance improvement and
fault coverage of both SEM and STEM (DYNOC mode) schemes on a five stage in-order pipelined
processor. This processor, implemented in 45nm technology, is based on the DLX instruction set
architecture. First application, RandGen, calculates a simple random number generation to give a
number between 0 and 255. The MatrixMult application multiplies two 50x50 integer matrices and
the BubbleSort program implements bubble sort algorithm on 5,000 half-word variables. Here, we
followed the same fault injection strategy and clock control used for two stage arithmetic pipeline.
For each benchmark, processor state is checked to verify the correctness of the computed results after
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simulation. From timing reports, the worst-case clock period, TMAX , is estimated as 6ns. Contamination
delay is increased by 3ns and the system operates at an optimal clock period of 4ns. At chip level,
area overhead incurred is less than 15% for the processor because significant area consumption of the
system comes from the memory system. The results for the three different benchmarks are presented in
Figure 4.12, showing relative execution times for conventional TMR, SEM and STEM schemes. From
this, we found that SEM offers 26.58% performance improvement over TMR and STEM offers 27.42%
over SEM.
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Figure 4.12 DLX Execution Rime for various benchmarks
4.7 Related Work
A multitude of fault tolerant architectures for tolerating soft errors have been developed in the
past by the research community. Many schemes incur performance overhead even during error-free
operation and do not support timing speculation. LEON-FT processor [29] uses TMR approach and
triplicates every flip flop in the processor and incurs a 100% area overhead. The REESE architecture
[34] takes advantage of spare elements in a superscalar processor to perform redundant execution.
DIVA [5] uses spatial redundancy by providing a separate, slower pipeline processor alongside the fast
processor. Reunion [71] exchanges control and data flow information between the cores to speed up
execution, while leveraging the redundancy to provide partial fault coverage. These approaches trade
performance and power for achieving soft error fault tolerant capabilities and none of these approaches
support timing speculation. Our technique, SEM, is the first technique in this class, that effectively
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exploits timing speculation and enhances performance without any logic duplication.
Multiple data latching schemes: Multiple clocking of data has been widely used to combat the
issue of soft errors in combinational logic [3, 48, 59, 52, 23, 66]. These approaches involve latching
data at different times or latching data and its delayed version using a single clock. Authors in [23]
optimize a temporal TMR framework that is presented in [48]. Even with this approach, the clock
frequency at which the circuit can be clocked must include the delays of combinational logic, double
the pulse width under consideration and also the delay incurred for the majority voting. Moreover, this
technique doesn’t detect false errors.
More recently, BISER, a DMR framework, using C-elements to tolerate soft errors has been pro-
posed [52]. It offers two techniques - 1) using logic duplication (DMR in space) and 2) time shifted
data (DMR in time). Also, using C-elements, authors in [66] propose soft error hardened flip flops
to tolerate wide error pulses or hard errors and applies DMR in both time and space domains. As we
explained, SEM requires only two comparison operations for error detection, as opposed to full voting
of multiple samples. With our distributed and temporal voting, SEM completely eliminates the error re-
covery penalty paid for false errors. This is a big contribution when compared to previously proposed
techniques, which use multiple data latching, by employing either DMR in space/time or temporal
TMR. Moreover, the fault detection overhead is taken off the critical path, which enables systems to
have performance levels comparable to a non-fault tolerant system in error-free operation. Previously
proposed schemes, using multiple data latching, employ either DMR or TMR [48, 52, 23, 66] and pay
penalty for false errors. SEM effectively combines timing speculation with temporal TMR framework
and completely removes the overhead paid for false errors. Also, when an error is detected, unlike
previous DMR solutions, we need not perform re-computation to recover the system state. This is a
salient feature of our approach, which has in-situ fast error recovery. Hence, SEM does not require any
checkpointing, thereby saving the time and space required to store the system state. Also, it is esti-
mated at static power is comparable to dynamic power with nano-sized transistors. Hence, providing
fault tolerance for energy constrained systems like embedded systems, with logic replication is not a
viable option. Systems designed with SEM cells improve reliability without logic replication.
As the performance margin between designing circuits to meet worst-case constraints verses typically-
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case constraints has become increasing significant, a new area of research emerged that aimed to use
fault tolerance to allow synchronous circuits to perform reliably at the highest possible clock frequen-
cies. A good summary of the principles of this new area is presented in [4]. The methods reviewed
in [4] are good initial attempts at pushing circuits close to safe limits for increasing performance; how-
ever, most approaches are not feasible in practice. For example, in [81] a method for increasing clock
frequency is proposed by adding redundancy and clocking each stage of a pipeline at a phase shift of
the original clock. However, the overheads associated with the redundancy and clocking resources of
this approach were not addressed for deployment into real-world designs. A more recent approach is
presented in [82], where the clock frequency of a simple in-order processor was tuned dynamically.
An extra delay chain with a worst-case propagation delay greater than the critical path of the processor
was used to guide frequency tuning. The delay chain was monitored constantly and detection of errors
were used to adjust the processor’s frequency to avoid errors within the processor as operating condi-
tions changed. A benefit of this approach is that it avoided errors within the processor, thus eliminating
the performance penalties often associated with error recovery circuitry. However, this approach can
adapt to changes in operating conditions, but can’t exploit data dependent circuit delay. This attribute
of circuit delay has been exploited in SPRIT3E to further extend the operation boundaries often set by
worst case estimates [9, 73].
Razor [25, 27] and SPRIT3E [9, 73] architectures employ timing error tolerance techniques to op-
erate beyond worst-case limits. Both these architectures use temporal fault tolerance by replicating
critical pipeline registers to improve performance beyond worst case limits. While Razor focuses on
achieving lower energy consumption by reducing supply voltage in each pipeline stage, SPRIT3E im-
proves performance of a superscalar processor by reliably overclocking the pipeline. Other closely
related works is Paceline [32], which employs leader-checker configuration in a chip multiprocessor
system and tolerates both timing and soft errors. Systems designed with STEM cells looks to improve
the reliability and performance by enabling reliable overclocking without logic duplication. Table 4.6
summarizes how our schemes differs from previously proposed techniques.
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Design LD SEP AC ES
Razor × × × √
SPRIT3E × × √ ×
Paceline
√ √ × ×
SEM × √ × ×
STEM × √ √ ×
Table 4.6 Comparison with other schemes in terms of Logic Duplication (LD),
Soft Error Protection (SEP), Aggressive Clocking (AC) and Energy
Savings (ES)
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented two efficient soft error mitigation schemes, SEM and STEM,
considering the approach of multiple clocking of data for tolerating soft errors in combinational logic.
Both these techniques remove the error detection overhead from the circuit critical path. These spe-
cialized register cells provide near 100% fault tolerance against transient faults. Our schemes tolerate
fast transient noise pulses, which is the principal characteristic of SETs. Both our schemes have no
significant performance overhead during error-free operation. SEM cells are capable of ignoring false
positives and recovers from errors using in-situ fast recovery avoiding recomputation. STEM cells has
soft error mitigation characteristics similar to SEM. STEM cells allow reliable dynamic overclocking
and are capable of tolerating timing errors as well. We also propose a scheme to manage phase shifts
between clocks locally with constant delay values. Such an approach increases the possible frequency
settings for aggressively clocked designs and also minimizes the clock routing resources.
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CHAPTER 5. TASK SCHEDULING
5.1 Task scheduling
Power consumption has become an important concern in the design of computer systems today
due to battery life considerations and environmental concerns. Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling
(DVFS) is an effective method to control the trade-off between performance and power consumption of
computing systems. DVFS schemes dynamically scale the voltage and frequency of the CPU to provide
variable amount of energy to process the workload. In general, scaling down voltage or frequency
of the processor, results in reducing dynamic power consumption. Intel SpeedStep, Advance Micro
Devices (AMD) PowerNow!, and Transmeta LongRun [64, 2, 28] are few examples for DVFS in real
processors. Recent developments include providing support for deeper integration of DVFS like adding
more power saving states (like deep p-states and c-states) [65].
Task scheduling play crucial role in multiprocessor systems which are widely deployed in high per-
formance computing systems like super computers, computer clusters etc. Task scheduling algorithms
for the multiprocessor system are usually developed based on the task graph. DVFS technique and task
scheduling can be combined to form a two phase process for effective resource usage and energy con-
sumption minimization. In this approach, first phase involve schedule generation, where tasks from the
given task graph are scheduled on a given multi-processor system by attempting to maximize objective
function which include minimizing makespan. In second phase, which involve slack reclamation, the
output of first phase is post processed to minimize the energy consumption using DVFS technique and
also without violating the deadline constraint.
The existing slack reclamation methods based on DVFS technique has a major shortcoming as they
map each task to a single frequency among the available discrete set of (V, f ) pairs of underlying DVFS
platforms. As shown in [63], using only single frequency results in uncovered slack time, which reflect
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into energy wastage. To minimize uncovered slack time, a novel approach, multiple voltage-frequency
selection dynamic voltage frequency scaling (MVFS-DVFS), has been proposed. MVFS-DVFS uses
linear combination of frequencies for slack reclamation. With MVFS-DVFS technique, authors have
shown that energy consumption can be pushed to the near optimal point of using (V, f ) pairs supported
by traditional DVFS schemes.
5.1.1 Chapter Contribution
For a given task, optimal energy under traditional DVFS schemes is achieved by using a single
frequency if the frequency of the system is assumed to be continuous. But real processors work with
a discrete set of freqeuncies and voltages, which we name as available DVFS (V, f ) spectrum. Linear
combination of frequencies has been proposed to achieve near optimal energy for systems operating
with discrete frequencies and voltages[63]. It is important to note that (V f ) pairs available from the
DVFS spectrum are set by conservative estimates.
In this chapter, we propose a new slack reclamation algorithm, aggressive dynamic and voltage
scaling (ADVFS), using reliable and aggressive systems. ADVFS exploits the enhanced voltage fre-
quency spectrum offered by reliable and aggressive designs for improving energy efficiency. We pro-
vide formal proofs to show that optimal energy for reliable and aggressive designs is achieved either by
using single frequency operation or by linear combination of frequencies. We evaluate the performance
of ADVFS using random task graphs and our simulations indicate that significant energy savings are
possible under ADVFS when compared with MVFS-DVFS and also continuous traditional DVFS.
5.1.2 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we present details on how to manage (V, f )
spectrum of reliable and aggressive systems and its impact on slack reclamation phase of task schedul-
ing algorithms. We present our algorithm, ADVFS, in Section 5.3 along with formal proofs. Our
simulation results are presented in Section 5.4.
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5.2 Energy Management Using Reliable And Aggressive Framework
5.2.1 Managing the (V, f ) spectrum
Available (V, f ) spectrum for reliable and aggressive systems is enhanced as additional voltage and
frequency swings are allowed beyond the conservative guard bands. Figure 5.1 presents the changes to
the (V, f ) spectrum, which is available for traditional DVFS algorithms. The dots on the solid diagonal
lines in Figure 5.1(a) and 5.1(b) represent the limited (V, f ) pairs available to traditional DVFS. In this
scenario, system voltage can be varied from Vmin to Vmax, while the frequency can be varied from fmin
to fmax in discrete steps (four possible pairs are shown in the figures). Using reliable and aggressive
designs, (V, f ) space is expandable by two orthogonal mechanisms: Aggressive Voltage Scaling (AVS)
[25] and Aggressive Frequency Scaling (AFS) [9, 73, 10]. Figures 5.1(a) and 5.1(b) illustrate enhanced
(V, f ) spectrum for AFS and AVS respectively.
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Figure 5.1 (a) AFS enhances the worst case frequency of DVFS (V, f ) pair by ∆ f
(b) AVS decreases the worst case voltage of DVFS (V, f ) pair by ∆V
At each (V, f ) pair of traditional DVFS, the voltage range available under AVS is V - ∆V to V .
Similarly, the frequency range available under AFS is f to f +∆ f . This range can be varied by manag-
ing the contamination delay (TCD) of the system. As an example, using AFS, starting from a traditional
DVFS pair, (VL, fL), the circuit’s TCD should satisfy the constraint given by Equation 5.1 to give a fre-
quency range of ∆ f . Similar area overheads can also be paid under AVS to allow voltage swing beyond
the conservative guard band. The area overhead associated with adjusting a circuit’s TCD to satisfy
this equation comes in addition to the timing overhead associated with error detection and correction
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circuitry.
TCD ≥ 1/ fL−1/( fL +∆ f ) (5.1)
5.2.2 Comparing AFS and AVS
For reliable and aggressive systems, the more aggressively the system is pushed beyond worst-
case constraints, the higher the probability of timing errors occurring. These error rates can become a
bounding constraint on performance/power gains of reliable and aggressive systems. Because AFS and
AVS use different physical mechanisms to achieve the desired operating point, the observed error rates
can differ. A given target (V, f ) pair can be reached in two ways: (1) overclocking using AFS from (V,
f −∆ f ) and (2) using AVS from (V +∆V, f ). Figure 5.2(a) and Figure 6.3(b) illustrate the nature of the
timing error rates observed for AFS and AVS.
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Depicts the difference in observed timing error rate for AFS and AVS
For example, (V1, f2) pair can be reached by overclocking from (V1, f1) or undervolting from (V2,
f2) and observed timing error profile is shown in Figure 5.2(a) and Figure 5.2(b) respectively. For a
given set of operating conditions and a given target (V, f ) pair, the differences in error rates of AFS
and AVS need can be characterized and be compared to determine the most appropriate approach, as
conceptually illustrated in Figure 5.2(c). Figure 5.2(c) represents the difference in timing error profile
(bounded between EL and EH) observed for AFS and AVS in reaching a target pair - (V1, f2) from
corresponding worst-case voltage and frequency pairs. In most cases, error rate lower limit i.e EL of
AFS and AVS match while upper limit i.e EH can differ. Assuming (V1, f1) and (V2, f2) to be adjacent
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pairs of traditional DVFS spectrum, it is safe to assume that difference in timing error rates of AFS
and AVS to match i.e. ∆EAV S = ∆EAFS. It is because circuit characteristics differ only marginally for
adjacent (V, f ) pairs and also the circuit will have same critical paths, under both AFS and AVS that
can cause a timing error.
5.2.3 Impact on slack reclamation
To study the impact of AFS and AVS on slack reclamation phase, we introduce the following
notation. We denote a given task with (T,K), where T is the task deadline and K is the number of clock
ticks required for the task execution. If system support continuous voltage and frequency, (V, f ) pair
for optimal enery consumption is calculated as follows. Frequency of the optimal (V, f ) pair, fopt , is
given by 5.2.
fopt = K/T (5.2)
It is important to note that voltage and frequency of the traditional DVFS spectrum are one-to-one
mapped. This implies, once frequency is known, voltage can also be known. Voltage of the optimal (V,
f ) pair can be calculated once fopt is known and we denote this voltage as Vopt . But most of the system
support discrete voltage and frequency and realization of is not possible. As pointed out in [63], linear
combination of frequencies can be used to reach optimum energy consumption. Also, assuming idle
power of the system to be negligible, power consumption, P at a (V, f ) pair is estimated as:
P ∝ c∗ f ∗ v2 (5.3)
where c is the effective capacitance. Using the above model, we have
I f fi < f j then P(Vi, fi)< P(Vj, f j) (5.4)
Since AFS increases frequency from worst case estimate, using AFS at a given (V, f ) pair can
enable the task as long as the error rate is less than the change in frequency. While system performance,
at the same time, energy consumption of the system increases but only slightly [73]. However, as AVS
58
decreases voltage, using AVS at a given (V, f ) pair can cause the task to violate deadline constraint and
thus making the schedule invalid. Therefore, AVS cannot be used by slack reclamation phase.
Theorem 1. Given a schedule, consisting of (V, f ) pair information, that minimizes the makespan for
a given task graph, AFS can be used to replace any (V, f ) pair in the schedule as long as the timing
error rate doesn’t exceed the change in frequency.
Proof. Lets say a task (T,K) is scheduled to run at (V, f ) to meet the deadline. Let twc denote the
worst-case clock period at (V, f ). Let tov denote the clock period after overclocking the circuit. Let n
be the number of cycles needed to recover from an error. Let us assume that the application runs at the
overclocked frequency of period tov with an error rate of k% under AFS. To achieve any performance
improvement at this frequency, Equation (5.5) must be satisfied. It states that even after accounting for
error recovery penalty, execution time required is still less than that required for worst-case frequency
operation. Equation (5.6) must be satisfied to have any performance improvement using reliable and
aggressive designs.
K× (tov +n× k× tov)< K× twc (5.5)
k <
(twc− tov)
n× tov or k <
( fov− f )
n× f (5.6)
As explained in Section 3.1.2, n=1 for reliable and aggressive systems. From Equation 5.6, we
notice that as long as the error rate is less than the change in frequency, AFS offers performance
enhancement and can be used for slack reclamation as it doesn’t violate deadline constraint.
According to Equation (5.6), for a frequency increase of 15%, the error rate must not be higher than
15%, for AFS to yield no performance improvement. For error rates less than 5%, a frequency increase
of only 5% is required to offer performance advantage over worst case designs.
5.3 Frequency Selection Using Reliable And Aggressive Designs
In this section, frequency selection for optimizing energy consumption using DVFS in reliable and
aggressive is investigated. Since, systems only support discrete voltage and frequencies, as shown in
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[63], optimal energy is always obtained two frequencies and also these two frequencies are adjacent
when processor energy consumption is a convex function of frequency. We also assume, energy con-
sumption is a convex function of frequency as it is valid for most systems. This scheme is named mul-
tiple voltage frequency selection dynamic voltage frequency scaling (MVFS-DVFS). But, (V, f ) pairs
considered by MVFS-DVFS are from conservative DVFS spectrum and doesn’t take additional voltage
and frequency swings allowed by reliable and aggressive designs into consideration. To overcome this
limitation, we propose, aggressive dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (ADVFS) for optimizing
energy consumption using reliable and aggressive systems. Details of ADVFS are presented below.
5.3.1 Frequency selection using ADVFS
Let us assume, that a task (T,K) is to be scheduled and (V1, f1) and (V2, f2) are the adjacent voltage-
frequency pairs for (Vopt , fopt). Let us say timing error rate at (Vopt , fopt) is k%. From, MVFS-DVFS,
we have
t1 = (T ∗ f2−K)/( f2− f1) (5.7)
t2 = (K−T ∗ f1)/( f2− f1) (5.8)
where t1 is the amount of time spent at (V1, f1) and t2 is the amount of time spent at (V2, f2). Also
f1 < fopt < f2. Following Theorem 1, let us denote fAFS as the maximum frequency that can be
reached under AFS without violating the deadline constraint. Since amount of frequency swing is
limited by timing error rate, we assume fAFS is below the midpoint of f1 and f2 i.e. 0.5* ( f1 + f2).
Based on fAFS, frequency selection problem is divided into two cases: (1) fAFS > fopt ∗ (1+ k) and (2)
fAFS ≤ fopt ∗ (1+ k). Figure 5.3 illustrates these two cases. Figure 5.3 (a) present the fopt relative to
(V1, f1) and (V2, f2), Figure 5.3 (b) present first scenario i.e. fAFS > fopt ∗ (1+ k) and Figure 5.3 (c)
present second scenario i.e. fAFS ≤ fopt ∗ (1+ k)
Theorem 2. If fAFS > fopt ∗ (1+ k), significant energy savings are always obtained by operating at a
single and aggressive (V, f ) pair as opposed to using linear combination of traditional (V, f ) pairs.
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Figure 5.3 Frequency selection using AFS
Proof. From MVFS-DVFS, energy consumption for task (T,K) is given by
EMV FS−DV FS = P1 ∗ t1 +P2 ∗ t2 (5.9)
Using ADVFS, energy consumption for task (T,K) is given by
EADV FS = P
′
1 ∗T (5.10)
Inorder to have single frequency operation,
EADV FS < EMV FS−DV FS
P
′
1 ∗T < P1 ∗ t1 +P2 ∗ t2
P
′
1 ∗ (t1 + t2)< P1 ∗ t1 +P2 ∗ t2
Rearranging terms, we have
t2 ∗ (P2−P′1)> t1 ∗ (P
′
1−P1)
t2/t1 > (P
′
1−P1)/(P2−P
′
1)
(t2/t1)> (x−1)/(y− x)
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where P2 = y∗P1 and P′1 = x∗P1
Assuming power consumption of the adjacent (V, f ) pairs differ by an order (at least more than
couple times) and assuming 5% power penalty under AFS [73], we have:
t1 > t2
From equation 5.7 and 5.8, we have:
T ∗ f2−K > K−T ∗ f1
fopt < ( f1 + f2)/2 (5.11)
As fAFS < 0.5∗ ( f1 + f2) and fopt < fAFS, Equation 5.11 will be satisfied. For this scenario, oper-
ation at aggressive (V, f ) pair is preferred. Therefore, task (T,K) need to operate at (V1, fopt ∗ (1+ k))
and energy savings when compared to MVFS-DVFS is given by EMV FS−DV FS/EADV FS.
Theorem 3. If fAFS ≤ fopt ∗ (1+ k), significant energy savings are always obtained by using linear
combination of a aggressive (V, f ) pair and a traditional (V, f ) pair.
Proof. From MVFS-DVFS, energy consumption for task (T,K) is given by
EMV FS−DV FS = P1 ∗ t1 +P2 ∗ t2 (5.12)
Using ADVFS, energy consumption for task (T,K) is given by
EADV FS = P
′
1 ∗ t
′
1 +P
′
2 ∗ t
′
2 (5.13)
In order to have linear combination of aggressive and traditional frequency pairs,
EADV FS < EMV FS−DV FS
P
′
1 ∗ t
′
1 +P2 ∗ t
′
2 < P1 ∗ t1 +P2 ∗ t2
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P2 ∗ (t2− t ′2)> P
′
1 ∗ t
′
1 +P1 ∗ t1
As f
′
1 > f1, f2 > f1, and V2 > V1, from equation 5.7 and 5.8, we have, t
′
1 > t1 and t
′
2 < t2. Rear-
ranging terms, we have:
P2 ∗ (t2− t ′2)/(P
′
1 ∗ t
′
1 +P1 ∗ t1)> 1
(t2− t ′2)/(( f
′
1 ∗ t
′
1/ f1)− t1)> 1
(( f
′
1 ∗ t
′
1/ f1)− t1)> 1 (5.14)
As f
′
1 > f1 and t
′
1 > t1, Equation 5.14 will be satisfied. Therefore, when fAFS ≤ fopt ∗(1+k), linear
combination of aggressive and traditional frequency pairs is preferred. Task (T,K) need to operate
at (V1, fopt ∗ (1 + k)) and (V2, f2) and energy savings when compared to MVFS-DVFS is given by
EMV FS−DV FS/EADV FS.
5.3.2 Impact on design implementation
From implementation perspective, more aggressively the system is constrained, more design time
for getting timing closure, thereby increasing the cost. Thefore, it is advantageous to build a system with
frequency swing less than 0.5* ( f1 + f2). Therefore, we recommend to build reliable and aggressive
system with frequency swings upto the mid point of traditional DVFS (V, f ) pairs.
5.4 Experiments and Results
This section presents simulation results of our proposed algorithm (ADVFS) and compare energy
savings with schemes RDVFS and MVFS-DVFS [63]. We use continuous voltage and frequency scal-
ing (CDVFS) as our base case. CDVFS gives optimal energy consumption for a given task set [63].
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5.4.1 Example
In this section, we present an example to explain how each algorithm uses task’s slack time for
energy consumption minimization. We chose power model similar to the example presented in [63],
where P(V, f ) = 1.367∗10−24 f 3. Table shows the task information, such as deadline constraint, clock
ticks required, and available frequencies for task execution.
Parameter Value
f1 60MHz
f2 80MHz
T 130 ms
K 9 million cycles
Table 5.1 Task parameters
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Figure 5.4 Comparing energy consumption of frequency selection schemes CD-
VFS, RDVFS, MVFS-DVFS, and ADVFS
Based on the parameters listed in the above table, we have:
• From Equation 5.2, we can calculate fopt , which is K/T = 69.2 MHz, which is not supported by
the underlying DVFS platform of the given system. The optimal energy consumption, which is
observed under CDVFS, is 58.96 mW.
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• Under RDVFS, processor executes the task at the higher frequency close to fopt . In this example,
given task is executed at 80 MHz and the corresponding energy consumption is 90.98mW.
• Under MVFS-DVFS, where linear combination of frequencies are used for task execution, given
task is executed for 0.07 ms at 60 MHz and for 0.06 at 80 MHz. The corresponding energy
consumption is 62.66 mW.
• Under ADVFS, as fopt is near the mid frequency of f1 and f2, assuming 5% timing error rate and
5% increase in power consumption under AFS, linear combination of aggressive and traditional
(V, f ) pairs is preferred and the corresponding energy consumption is close 39.48 mW.
From above discussion, we observe that RDVFS allocates more energy than the required amount
by nearly 50%. MVSFS-DVFS reduces the energy consumption close to the optimal energy consump-
tion, which is observed under CDVFS. However, as DVFS (V, f ) pairs are enhanced by reliable and
aggressive designs, ADVFS reduces the energy consumption by nearly less than 33% of the optimal
energy that can achieved by using traditional (V, f ) pairs.
5.4.2 Experimental Settings
In our simulations, two schedulers: (1) list scheduler with Longest Processing Time first (LPT) and
(2) list scheduler with Shortest Processing Time first (SPT) are used to produce task schedules mini-
mizing makespan. We have used MATLAB torsche toolbox to generate schedule using LPT and SPT
for random task graphs [74]. Once the schedule is generated, we ran our slack reclamation algorithm
to compare ADVFS with other schemes.
For our study, we have chosen voltage frequency of two real processors: (1) Transmeta Crusoe
[28] and (2)Intel Xscale [86]. Table 5.2 presents the available (V, f ) pairs on Transmeta processor and
Table 5.3 presents the available (V, f ) pairs on Intel Xscale processor.
Frequency (MHz) Voltage (V) Power (W)
667 1.6 5.3
600 1.5 4.2
533 1.35 3.0
400 1.225 1.9
300 1.2 1.3
Table 5.2 Available (V, f ) pairs for Transmeta processor
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Frequency (MHz) Voltage (V) Power (W)
1000 1.8 1.6
800 1.6 0.9
600 1.3 0.4
400 1 0.17
150 0.75 0.085.3
Table 5.3 Available (V, f ) pairs for Intel Xscale processor
To evaluate the performance of ADVFS, we have generated random task graphs consisting of dif-
ferent number of tasks. Required clock cycles of the randomly generated tasks is varied uniformly
between 5-10 million cycles and execution time is also uniformly sampled between 100-300 ms. Using
the available (V, f ) pairs as shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, task schedule has been obtained by min-
imizing the makespan. We assume the system is comprised of two processors, where each processor
supports AFS. As timing error rate can bound the achievable frequency swings under AFS, we have
considered scenario where fAFS ≤ fopt ∗ (1+k) for all tasks. Out of two possible scenarios, case where
fAFS ≤ fopt ∗ (1+ k) is preferred case if large frequency swings are not possible under AFS.
For all the random tasks, we assume timing error rate increases uniformly upto 5% at fAFS. As
reported in [73], we have modelled the power penalty for running at higher frequency and also to
recover from occasional timing error to be under 5% . Also, we ignore the overhead of voltage and
frequency transitions as they are relatively much smaller than the execution time of the tasks.
5.4.3 Results
Figure 5.4 presents our simulation results. It compares energy consumption of frequency selection
schemes CDVFS, RDVFS, MVFS-DVFS, and ADVFS. As we can notice from figure, LPT and SPT did
not have any significant effect in terms of energy consumption. On average, RDVFS when compared
with CDVFS, consume more than 33% energy. MVFS-DVFS energy consumption is smaller than RD-
VFS for all cases and its average energy consumption is more 12% of CDVFS scheme. Of all schemes
including CDVFS, our scheme, ADVFS, consume lower energy. On average, ADVFS consumes less
than 18% energy when compared with CDVFS.
Figure 5.5 compare energy consumption of RDVFS, MVFS-DVFS and ADVFS schemes for Intel
processor using SPT list scheduling. As we notice from the figure, with increase in number of tasks,
possible energy savings decrease for all schemes. This is due to the increase in system utilization
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Figure 5.5 Comparing energy comsumption of RDVFS, MVFS-DVFS and AD-
VFS for Intel Xscale processor
as number of processors has remained constant. AFS has been proposed earlier as a performance
enhancing scheme [73]. But ADVFS uses AFS from a different angle, where in benefits from operating
beyond conservative worst case estimate are effectively translated into energy savings.
5.4.4 Overheads
Timing error recovery incurs power and performance overheads. Based on studies conducted in
[73, 25], we account these power and performance overheads in our simulations. However, the main
overhead incurred by reliable and aggressive designs is fixing the circuit contamination delay (CD) to
a required value. ADVFS is beneficial when relatively small timing error rates are observed, similar to
the error rates presented for Alpha processor in Section 3.2. Increasing CD involves rapid increase in
silicon area, as buffers need to be inserted in the short circuit delay paths. As shown in [73, 25], these
area overheads, along with timing error detection circuitry of reliable and aggressive designs, are about
3% at chip-level for a microprocessor implementation.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a new slack reclamation algorithm, aggressive dynamic and voltage
scaling (ADVFS), using reliable and aggressive systems. ADVFS exploits the enhanced voltage fre-
quency spectrum offered by reliable and aggressive designs for improving energy efficiency. We also
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provide guidelines on how to manage the enhanced voltage frequency spectrum and the constraints
required for limiting the maximum attainable under ADVFS. We also provide formal proofs to show
that significant energy savings are attainable either by using single frequency or by linear combination
of frequencies. Our scheme can be integrated as post processing step with any of the existing static and
dynamic task scheduling algorithms. Our simulations on random task graphs show 18% reduction in
energy when compared with continuous DVFS schemes and over more than 33% when compared with
scheme using linear combination of traditional voltage frequency pairs.
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CHAPTER 6. SECURITY
6.1 Introduction
As implementation technology scales to nano-scale dimensions, electronic systems are now built
with more complex and powerful integrated circuits. Along with the performance and power con-
straints, security also is emerging as a first class design constraint. This is especially true for embedded
systems, which are deployed widely in domains ranging from mobile phones to smart cards. Rapid
enhancements in VLSI technology, combined with innovations at various design hierarchies have con-
tributed to meet the power and the performance constraints. For all concerns related to security, cryp-
tography is being applied to guard the systems from known attacks.
6.1.1 Side-channel Power Attacks
Power analysis attacks are cryptanalytic attacks that exploit information leaks from a cryptographic
system. The idea to use cryptographic system power traces for extracting secret key was first presented
by Kocher [39]. Power analysis attacks involve two basic techniques: Simple power analysis (SPA)
and differential power analysis (DPA). SPA attacks involve first order power analysis and are mounted
on systems by using the fact that different operations in secret-key crypto algorithms consume different
power. Using SPA attacks, secret information, such as secret key or parts of it, is inferred directly
through visual inspection of the power traces. DPA attacks are based on statistical computations and are
much powerful than SPA attacks as no detailed knowledge about the cryptographic system is required.
An alternative to DPA was suggested by Brier named Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), which offers
more efficient power analysis based on linear correlation techniques [15].
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6.1.2 Chapter Contribution
We develop a new countermeasure using dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS). Earlier,
a similar approach, named random dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (RDVFS), was investigated
by Yang et. al. to reduce the correlation of input data to the power consumption. RDVFS reduce
the correlation by varying the system voltage and frequency randomly [87]. But, later it was shown
that RDVFS approach cannot prevent DPA/CPA power attacks [7]. Major limitation for RDVFS based
countermeasure is on account of one-to-one mapping between voltage and frequency of DVFS (V, f )
pairs. As pointed out in [7], even under RDVFS, system operating frequency can be easily estimated
from the power traces collected. Once the frequency is estimated correctly, corresponding voltage can
also be known and attacker can use this (V, f ) pair to estimate the secret key. We overcome this inherent
limitation of DVFS platforms by breaking the one-to-one mapping between voltage and frequency of
(V, f ) pairs.
We propose to use reliable and aggressive designs as building blocks, which also enable typical-
case operation. Reliable and aggressive designs enable typical-case operation by using circuit-level
timing speculation effectively [73, 25]. They support Aggressive Frequency Scaling (AFS) [73] and
Aggressive Voltage Scaling (AVS) [25]. Such systems not only enable AFS or AVS but also break one-
to-one mapping between voltage and frequency of DVFS (V, f ) pairs. Using Fisher’s Z-transform, we
demonstrate that our technique reduce the correlation present between two given signals at statistically
significant (vulnerable to DPA/CPA) levels to statistically insignificant levels (secure from DPA/CPA)
under 95% degree of confidence interval.
To estimate the performance/power advantages and to study the changes to (V, f ) spectrum of
DVFS platforms, we conducted our experiments on an AES 8-bit S-box. Our results show that using
AFS technique, an enhanced (V, f ) spectrum can be realized without any further additional resources
to combat power attacks. Moreover, the performance of S-box is increased by 22% over the worst-
case estimate. Also, it has decreased the correlation for the correct key by an order and has increased
the probability by almost 3.5X times for wrong keys when compared with the original key to exhibit
maximum correlation. Thus, our technique add a new dimension to power attack countermeasures by
effectively exploiting typical-case operation.
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6.1.3 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we present background details of power analysis
attacks and related work. We present DVFS based countermeasure details in Section 6.3. In Section 6.5,
we explain how such designs break one-to-one mapping between voltage and frequency of DVFS (V,
f ) pairs. In Section 6.6, we model and analyze the power behavior of systems using our approach.
Then we present security analsyis to demonstrate the resistance of our countermeasure in Section 6.7.
We present our results in Section 6.8.
6.2 Background
6.2.1 Theory behind Power Attacks
The most effective power analysis attack is differential power analysis (DPA). It combines an actual
power trace, obtained for several encryptions rounds with known inputs and an estimated power trace,
which is generated using a hypothesized key and predictions about the transitions of internal nodes.
Next, using statistical evaluation, most likely value of the key is determined. As already demonstrated,
DPA is powerful enough to successfully retrieve the key from implementations of AES [39, 40].
In CMOS technology, for an applied stimulus, when a value inside a component (e.g. a register)
of digital electronic system changes from logic 0 → 1 or logic 1→0, associated power consumption
is significantly higher than when the values remains constant i.e. logic 0→0 or logic 1→1. This
difference in power values leads to data dependent power characteristics for a system implemented in
CMOS technology.
Initially the DPA attack was developed using a distance-of-mean test, which simply takes the dif-
ference between the mean of two sets of data. DPA was later extended to correlation power analysis
(CPA) which again involves hypothesizing a secret key and then analyzing correlation coefficients be-
tween the actual power trace measured and the estimated power trace [15]. Models like hamming
weight, hamming distance, or toggle count have been used for estimating the power consumption of
the cryptographic system [54]. Search over the entire key space is then conducted and the correlation
coefficients are determined. Correct key is the one which maximizes correlation factor, ρ , which is
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given by Equation 6.1.
ρ =
E(PA,PE)−E(PA)E(PE)
σPAσPE
(6.1)
where PA denotes the actual power trace measured, PE denotes the estimated power trace, E()
denotes the expectation, and σ denotes the variance. For N power traces recorded for N different inputs,
each trace having M recording points, attacker calculates the correlation trace, ρK,NM, for hypothesized
key K. For example, in AES, all possible keys for the S-box is 256. For all possible 256 key values,
correlation traces are then constructed with the help of hypothetical power model. In each correlation
trace, ρK,NM, there is a highest peak, ρK,N , and largest ρ among all ρK,N indicates the correct key.
6.2.2 Related Work
The past countermeasures for power analysis attacks can broadly be classified into three categories:
balanced logic styles, masking techniques at gate-level and algorithmic-level, and dynamic voltage and
frequency varying techniques. Balanced logic style techniques, such as Sense Amplifier Based Logic
(SABL), and Wave dynamic and differential logic (WDDL) [76, 79], attempt to avoid the leakage of
information by reducing the variance in the power consumed for different logic transitions. Logic repli-
cation is essential in order to balance the logic so that there is always one transition. For combinational
logic, it requires doubling the amount of logic and to balance flip-flops, four normal ones are normally
required. Therefore, overall area of the design will be more than double.
Using simulation, Tiri and Verbauwhede found that WDDL logic style is DPA resistant when layout
parasitic are ignored [78]. But ASIC developed by using single and dual rail AES core [77], is found
to reveal 11 out of 16 secret key bytes. Dual rail designs come at a high cost in terms of performance,
area, and power. For the WDDL ASIC, the chip area has increased by 3 times, the speed is reduced
by a factor of 4, and the power consumption has increased by 4 times[Goodwin]. Approaches like
pre-charge logic and gate-level masking are conjoined to develop Random Switching Logic (RSL) [75]
and masked dual-rail pre-charge logic (MDPL) [62]. Use of these logic styles improves DPA resistance
but must be applied at the transistor or even deeper design levels. Consequently, overheads such as
design effort, area, power consumption, and performance limit their adoptability. Asynchronous design
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methodology like clock less design [88] offer no DPA resistance unless it is combined with dual rail
balanced logic techniques.
Algorithm-level making techniques attempt to hide internal variable. Components performing lin-
ear operations are easy to mask. Therefore, many approaches were focused to develop masked AES
S-box [11, 61], as it performs non-linear operation. But later in time, Mangard et al presented a prac-
tical power analysis attack, by changing the hypothetical power model from hamming weight/distance
model to toggle count model. Using this power model, two masked AES implementations which re-
vealed the secret key [47]. Similarly, other masking approaches are breakable by using more precise
power models. On average, it was found that, by using masking techniques, speed of the system reduces
twice and area increases by 3 times and still being susceptible to DPA attacks [Goodwin].
Third class of countermeasures adopt dynamic changes to voltage and frequency of the system
such as RDVFS [87]. Unlike other countermeasures, this approach has increased the entropy of power
traces and provided 27% energy reduction and has only 16% time overhead for DES encryption and
decryption algorithms. However, later it was shown that RDVFS cannot prevent CPA attacks [7]. To
overcome this limitation, Baddam et al propose to vary voltage randomly at a fixed frequency, as on-the-
fly frequency changes are detectable [7]. Using this approach, they were able to reduce the correlation
by five times. But power consumption of the system increases heavily in-order to provide high voltage
swings and also cannot operate beyond worst-case estimates. Also, at higher voltages transistors can
enter saturation region and hiding voltage may not be effective.
6.3 Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling
Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) is an approach to provide variable amount of en-
ergy for a task/process by changing the operating voltage and frequency of a system dynamically. Its
primary goal is to provide optimal power required by the underlying task/process, thus reducing the
system energy consumption. Systems supporting DVFS has a set of predefined discrete voltage levels.
As the circuit delay has strong association with the supply voltage, system frequency is also adjusted to
the corresponding worst-case circuit delay. The voltage-frequency, (V, f ), pairs are estimated off-line
during the design phase and determined after fine tuning the system characteristics after fabrication.
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This process of (V, f ) pair estimation involves studying system characteristics under worst-case set-
tings.
Table 6.1 shows the (V, f ) pairs for the Intel’s speedstep technology [64]. As we notice from
the table, frequency can be changed from 600MHz to 2GHz in steps of 200MHz, while corresponding
voltage level is varied from 0.988 V to 1.340 V. Such a spectrum contain (V, f ) pairs that offer high per-
formance and high power levels as well as (V, f ) pairs that offer reduced performance and lower power
consumption. The later typically are used when system is idle. For example, the voltage-frequency pair
(1.34V, 2GHz) has higher performance and power levels when compared with the voltage-frequency
pair (0.988V, 600MHz).
With using such (V, f ) spectrum, DVFS platforms provide the necessary computation power for
systems as applications become increasingly sophisticated by exploiting hardware characteristics. DVFS
algorithms alternate between (V, f ) pairs at a constant or dynamic rate and switching to a new config-
uration involves some time penalty. However, as shown in [36], this penalty is in the order of ns and
can be be compensated by carefully choosing the DVFS rate along with appropriate choice of DVFS
algorithm.
6.3.1 DVFS based countermeasure
DPA attacks discover correlations in time between system power traces under the assumption that
the cryptosystem operates at a constant frequency. This observation is leveraged to develop an area and
power efficient countermeasure, random DVFS (RDVFS), that breaks this key assumption [87]. It used
traditional DVFS mechanisms to randomly change frequencies during system operation. However,
this simple and area efficient technique has limitations. In [7] it was shown that successful DPA/CPA
attacks could still be mounted on systems using RDVFS countermeasure.
6.3.2 Characteristics of correlation under RDVFS
The relative difference between the maximum and second maximum value of ρ over the entire
key space play a dominant role in discovering the secret key, which is introduced formally in [84].
It is important to note that the uncertainty in distinguishing the correct key depend on the degree of
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Frequency f (in MHz) Voltage V (in Volt)
0600 0.988
0800 1.052
1000 1.100
1200 1.140
1400 1.196
1600 1.244
1800 1.292
2000 1.340
Table 6.1 Intel Speedstep voltage-frequency (V, f ) pairs
difference between these values. Any countermeasure increases the number of traces to collect by
minimizing the degree of difference between these two values.
Baddam et. al. performed extensive transistor-level simulations of AES and conducted in-depth
study using toggle count power model to validate RDVFS countermeasure [7]. We summarize charac-
teristics of ρ observed in this study below.
• Case-I: When (V, f ) pair is known, maximum ρ is observed for the correct key and Pearson cor-
relation coefficients are in range [0.06, -0.02]. Another important parameter to note is the second
maximum value of ρ . This value is estimated to be around 0.03 and this plays an important role
in identifying the correct key.
• Case-II: When (V, f ) pair is unknown, maximum value of ρ is observed for an incorrect key and
Pearson correlation coefficients are in range [0.03, -0.02]. Also, second maximum value of ρ is
close to 0.022.
6.3.3 Changes in correlation due to misprediction of (V, f ) pair
As we notice from above discussion, while mounting a power attack, voltage and frequency infor-
mation cannot be ignored for a system using DVFS. Since power is directly dependent on voltage and
frequency of the system, any misprediction of (V, f ) pair will have a big impact on ρ and it can lead the
attacker to hypothesize a wrong key. For example, Figure 6.1 presents a case where misprediction of (V,
f ) pair introduce changes in correlation calculation. In Figure 6.1, PE1 represents the estimated power
trace by the attacker when (V, f ) pair is known and PE2 represents the estimated power trace when (V,
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Figure 6.1 Figure showing the trend changes in the estimated power trace due to
(V, f ) pair misprediction
f ) pair is unknown. Lets say, ρ1 and ρ2 are the estimated values of correlation using these traces. We
assume inputs are fed in the same order for estimating PE1 and PE2. We also assume, attacker estimates
the correct (V, f ) pair while estimating PE2 at time t1 and t2 (assuming 50% success probability).
As shown in the figure, while constructing trace PE2, (V, f ) pair misprediction happen at time t3
and t4 and change the trend in the estimated power trace. Originally, change that is expected between
time t2 and t3 is nullified due to the first misprediction at time t3, while the second misprediction at
time t4 introduces a big jump in the power value when no change in expected. Since inputs are same
at the respective time intervals, such misprediction influence ρ2, causing ρ2 to differ from ρ1. Degree
of difference between ρ1 and ρ2 will depend on misprediction rate. Such changes in correlation can
ultimately lead the attacker to hypothesize a wrong key. Also, under RDVFS, when (V, f ) pair is
unknown, it is not possible for a single key to exhibit maximum correlation value. It can be observed
for different keys depending on (V, f ) pair misprediction. Under such scenarios, attacker needs to do
multiple attempts to guess the secret key.
Main vulnerability of RDVFS is the one-to-one mapping that is present between voltage and fre-
quency of traditional DVFS (V, f ) pairs, which can be exploited by attackers to recover correlations
between power traces. Glitches in a power trace can be used to estimate frequency. Once frequency is
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known, voltage can also be trivially found. This assumes, of course, that the attacker has knowledge
of the one-to-one map implemented by the DVFS mechanism (contrary to security through obscurity).
We propose an alternative to the work in [87] and use aggressive and reliable building blocks to break
the one-to-one mapping between the voltage and frequency of (V, f ) pairs used by conventional DVFS
algorithms.
6.4 Reliable and Aggressive Designs
In a pipelined system, the clock frequency is determined based on the critical path across all stages,
under adverse operating conditions. Traditional design methodologies for the worst-case operating con-
ditions are too conservative as the critical timing delays rarely occur in tandem, during typical circuit
operation. Moreover, circuit delay has a strong association with the data being processed. For in-
stance, in a carry-propagate adder, the worst-case delay occurs only when the carry is to be propagated
through each bit-slice, which occurs only for a specific input data set [4]. Such infrequent occurrence
of critical timing delays has opened a new domain of study that allows improvement of systems per-
formance to a greater extent through timing speculation at circuit level. Speculation at this level allows
voltage/frequency swings beyond worst-case estimates.
In Razor [25], timing speculation has been exploited in voltage domain using adaptive voltage
scaling. We refer to this technique as Aggressive Voltage Scaling (AVS). In adaptive and reliable
overclocking [73], timing speculation has been exploited in frequency domain using adaptive frequency
scaling. We refer to this technique as Aggressive Frequency Scaling (AFS). Impressive results are
achieved using AVS and AFS and it enables systems to work past the worst-case limitations. Both these
complementary techniques are well suited for improving resistance against power analysis attacks.
Security strength offered by AVS is similar to that of AFS. We keep our discussion in the rest of the
chapter to AFS and the analysis can be easily extended to AVS.
6.4.1 System Architecture
Since the data forwarded at higher frequencies can be faulty (DataOut signal in Figure 3.1 (a)),
wrong cipher texts can be forwarded and the security of the whole system can be compromised. This
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can be avoided by inserting an extra buffer at the last pipeline stage of the system and the modified
timing error detection circuit is shown in Figure 6.2. It should be noted that timing error detection
circuitry of only last pipeline stage need to modified as shown in Figure 6.2. Registers Main1 and
Backup are clocked similarly to registers Main and Backup shown in Figure 3.1(a) and register Main2
will always have correct data. During normal operation, register Main2 loads from Main1. If a timing
error is detected, it loads from register Backup and the system need to be stalled for a cycle. This
operation is identical to the recovery mechanism of a timing error and system level recovery is identical
to the recovery mechanisms developed in [6, 73].
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Figure 6.2 Figure highlighting the architecture of the cryptographic system and
how the timing critical pipeline registers of last pipeline stage need to
be modified to prevent forwarding of faulty cipher texts.
6.4.2 Performance Analysis
A key factor that limits frequency scaling of AFS is the timing error rate. As frequency is scaled
higher, the number of input combinations that result in delays greater than the new clock period also
increases. The impact of error rate on frequency scaling is analyzed as follows:
Let twc denote the worst-case clock period. Let tov denote the clock period after overclocking the
circuit. Let n be the number of cycles needed to recover from an error. Let us assume that sytem takes
N clock cycles to execute, under normal conditions. Let us assume that the application runs at the
overclocked frequency of period tov with an error rate of k%. Because of the extra buffer added at the
last pipeline stage, there will be latency of one clock cycle when the system is operating at clock period
tov. To achieve any performance improvement at this frequency, Equation (6.2) must be satisfied. It
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states that even after accounting for error recovery penalty, execution time required is still less than that
required for worst-case frequency operation. For large value of N, Equation (6.3) must be satisfied to
have any performance improvement using reliable and aggressive designs.
(N +1)× (tov +n× k× tov)< N× twc (6.2)
k <
(twc− tov)
n× tov (6.3)
As explained above, for our technique n=1. According to Equation (6.3), for a frequency increase
of 15%, the error rate must not be higher than 15%, for our technique to yield no performance im-
provement. For error rates less than 1%, a frequency increase of 1% is required for our scheme to offer
performance advantage over worst case designs.
6.5 Breaking connection between DVFS (V, f ) pairs
In this section, we first explain how the one-to-one mapping between voltage and frequency of
DVFS (V, f ) pairs is broken using aggressive designs. Then, using aggressive designs, we demonstrate
how to manage the (V, f ) spectrum used by the traditional DVFS. Figure 6.3 illustrates the solution
space of (V, f ) pairs, available for traditional DVFS. The voltage can be varied from Vmax to Vmin
(where Vmax > Vmin), while the frequency can be varied from fmax to fmin (where fmax > fmin). The
voltage-frequency pair (Vmax, fmax), has the highest energy consumption while the voltage-frequency
pair (Vmin, fmin), has the lowest energy consumption.
In Figure 6.3 (a) and (b), (V, f ) pairs present on the straight line (connected through •), are the
available pairs for traditional DVFS approach. We denote such pairs having one-to-one mapping or
linear relationship by (VL, fL). In such a sample space, once the voltage V or the frequency f is known,
other unknown parameter is also known because of their relationship. Since frequency f can be esti-
mated from the power traces, the (V, f ) pair is no longer an unknown and RDVFS countermeasure is
therefore vulnerable to DPA/CPA power attacks.
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Figure 6.3 Figure showing possible voltage frequency pairs for (a) DVFS and
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6.5.1 Changes in DVFS (V, f ) spectrum
Using reliable and aggressive designs, voltage-frequency solution space is expandable by two
mechanisms - Aggressive Voltage Scaling (AVS) [25] and Aggressive Frequency Scaling (AFS) [73].
With AVS, at each voltage and frequency pair, given by (VL, fL), operating configuration can be
changed by varying voltage VL, between (V1, V2), i.e., deviating from the linear relationship and allow-
ing to traverse horizontally, as illustrated in Figure 6.3 (b). With AFS, at each voltage and frequency
pair, given by (VL, fL), operating configuration can be changed by varying frequency fL, between ( f1,
f2), i.e., deviating from the linear relationship and allowing to traverse vertically, as illustrated in Figure
6.3 (a). At each (VL, fL) configuration, the voltage range available for AVS i.e., ∆V = V1−V2 or the
frequency range available for AFS i.e., ∆ f = f2− f1, can be increased to enhance the available (V, f )
spectrum. This is achieved by managing the contamination delay (TCD) of the system. Using AFS, at
a (VL, fL), to have a frequency range of ∆ f , where ∆ f = f2 - f1, TCD of the circuit should satisfy the
constraint given by Equation 6.4.
TCD ≥ 1/ fL−1/( fL +∆ f ) (6.4)
Using the data presented in Table 6.1, at voltage-frequency pair (1.1V, 1000MHz), to have a fre-
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quency swing of 200 MHz, TCD of the circuit should be increased to 0.167ns. For 400 MHz frequency
swing, TCD of the circuit need to be increased to 0.286ns. This area overhead comes in addition to the
overhead caused by timing error detection and correction circuitry.
For example, let us assume that {(V1, f1), (V2, f2), (V3, f3), (V4, f4)} are the supported voltage-
frequency configurations with the traditional DVFS approach and also the frequencies are equidistant
i.e. ∆ f = f2− f1 = f3− f2 = f4− f4. Figure 6.4(a) presents possible state transitions between states (V1,
f1) and (V2, f2). Also, let us assume that, TCD of the circuit is increased beyond twice the maximum of
frequency differences between the adjacent (V, f ) pairs, i.e., 2∆ f . Under such a scenario, Figure 6.4(b)
presents all possible state transitions for voltage pair (V1, f1) under both AFS and DVFS. Under DVFS
only one state transition is possible from (V1, f1). This is the state transition between (V1, f1) and (V2,
f2) as shown in the figure. But under AFS, two more additional state transitions are possible from (V1,
f1). These are represented as state transition between (V1, f1) and (V1, f2), and (V1, f1) and (V1, f3). It
should also be noted that state transition between (V1, f2) and (V1, f3) is also possible under AFS and
state transition between (V1, f2) and (V2, f2) is also possible under AVS as shown in the figure.
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Figure 6.4 Possible state transitions for (V1, f1)pair (a) under DVFS and (b) under
reliable and aggressive techniques AFS and AVS
For the system configuration presented above, Table 6.2 presents possible (V, f ) pairs for each
voltage level under DVFS and AFS approaches. For frequency f3, from the table, we notice that the
system can operate at three voltage levels, namely V2, V3, or V4. Even under random DVFS, if the
attacker estimates the frequency by observing glitches on the power line, it is no longer possible to
estimate the actual voltage level, as the one-to-one mapping between voltage and frequency is broken.
Under such situations, as shown in [7], attacker observes an incorrect key. Therefore, we propose to
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prevent power attacks using reliable and aggressive designs assisted with random DVFS. It should also
be noted that similar changes to (V, f ) spectrum can be observed by employing AVS.
In addition to breaking the one-to-one mapping between the voltage and frequency, it also increases
the randomness present in the power traces. Let us assume that a system built with reliable and aggres-
sive designs is set to operate with k% timing error rate. This implies that out of every N operations
executed, on an average k extra operations are also executed in the crypto-system. This increases the
entropy of the power traces collected roughly in the order of ln(2N(1+k)/2N) = Nk, assuming every
operation has a unique value of power consumption. For example, for every 100 operations executed in
the system, entropy of power traces can be increased as high as 25 times while operating at 25% error
rate.
Voltage Level DVFS AFS
V1 (V1, f1) (V1, f1),(V1, f2),(V1, f3)
V2 (V2, f2) (V2, f2),(V2, f3),(V2, f4)
V3 (V3, f3) (V3, f3),(V3, f4),(V3, f5)
V4 (V4, f4) (V4, f4),(V4, f5),(V4, f6)
Table 6.2 Possible (V, f ) pairs using DVFS and AFS
6.5.2 Impact of timing errors
When a system is operating at single (V, f ) pair using AFS/AVS, it may be possible to detect the
occurrence of a timing error. But under random DVFS scheme where (V, f ) pairs are selected randomly;
it may not be possible to identify the timing error events precisely. This is due to the following. Let
us assume that timing error detection and recovery events are high power consuming operations. At a
given frequency, when high power values are detected in the trace, it can be attributed to two events:
1) a timing error event or 2) normal system operation executing at the same frequency but for a higher
voltage as such configurations are supported by reliable and aggressive designs. This increases the
fault positive rate in (V, f ) pair estimation and causes trend changes in ρ calculation. It is important to
note that, these trend changes cannot be cancelled out using frequency-based attacks, as the system is
using random DVFS. Similarly, trend changes in estimated power trace happen even if we consider the
timing error events as low energy operations. Therefore, side effect of aggressive designs i.e. timing
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errors detection do not leak any useful information.
In worst-case scenario, if all the timing error occurrences are detected in the power trace, leakage
about (V, f ) pair can be completely eliminated by making sure that timing errors happen at more
than one voltage for a given frequency or vice versa. Therefore, the challenge in using reliable and
aggressive designs is to come up with an enhanced (V, f ) spectrum that eliminates one-to-one mapping
and also maps frequency to atleast two different voltage levels where timing errors can happen. For the
(V, f ) spectrum presented in Table 6.2, we can notice that for frequency f3, timing errors can happen at
(V1, f3) and (V2, f3) pairs. Traversal through such an enhanced (V, f ) spectrum effectively eliminates
possible information leakage through timing error detection.
In Section 6.3.3, we have assumed that only 50% of time correct (V, f ) pair is predicted accurately
and also assume trend change in estimated power trace on (V, f ) pair misprediction. Main insight of this
example is to show how (V, f ) pair misprediction impact correlation value. Even, if we assume trend
change to happen for only 50% of time on misprediction, trend changes still happen in the estimated
power trace. For example, assuming misprediction during time t3 and time t4 (50% misprediction rate)
and trend change to happen only for time t3 misprediction (trend change only for 50% of mispredicted
time), still influence correlation. This is equal to 0.5*(1) and 0.5*(0.5)=75% prediction accuracy. Fol-
lowing our above discussion, using our solution, any frequency needs to be mapped to more than two
voltages. So for (V, f ) spectrum presented in Table 6.2, assuming all (V, f ) pair for a given frequency
to be equally likely and trend change to cause for only 50% of time on (V, f ) pair misprediction, pre-
diction accuracy is not greater than 0.33*(1) + 0.33*(0.5) + 0.33*(0.5) = 66%, which is still lower than
the prediction accuracy we assumed in Section 6.3.3.
6.5.3 Overheads
One of the main overheads incurred by reliable and aggressive schemes is fixing the circuit contam-
ination delay to a required value and the register duplication. Not all registers need to be duplicated.
Duplication of registers that fall only on timing critical paths is required. As shown in previous re-
search, area overheads can be kept to minimal and is about 3% at chip-level [25]. Also, flip-flops
may enter a metastable state when operated with a overclocked frequency (AFS) or with undervolting
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(AVS). Incorporation of a metastability detection circuits, similar to the one developed in [25], are
needed.
6.6 Power Analysis
Attackers use power models like hamming weight model, toggle count model etc. to deduce the cor-
relation between the hypothesized key and the actual key [54]. They assume that voltage and frequency
are kept constant and develop or use already existing power models. For DVFS based countermea-
sures, power models need accurate voltage and frequency information as there is very high dependence
of power on system voltage and frequency. Any error in (V, f ) pair estimation leads to trend changes as
discussed in Section 6.3.2. In this section, we first model the power consumed by a system operating
under AFS and discuss how each component can influence the correlation under random DVFS.
6.6.1 Static Power
The power dissipated by a circuit can be classified into two broad categories - static power (Pstat)
and dynamic power (Pdyn). Static power (Pstat) is the power dissipated by a circuit when it is not
switching, i.e. when it is inactive or static. The largest percentage of Pstat is due to the source to drain
sub-threshold leakage current and Pstat can be modeled as,
Pstat ∝ IL × V (6.5)
where IL is the total leakage current of the circuit and V is the voltage level at which the circuit
is being operated. From Equation 6.5, we notice that Pstat is independent of clock frequency, f and
depends on voltage V only. Reliable and aggressive designs tolerate timing errors by employing a
one-cycle low overhead error recovery mechanism [25, 73]. For small error rates, its impact on static
power is minimal and can be ignored while accounting for the static power of systems employing AFS.
Even if frequency is estimated from the power traces, error in voltage estimation has a direct impact on
correlation factor. Pstat can be visualized as a component providing random bias each cycle.
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6.6.2 Dynamic Power
Dynamic power (Pdyn) is the power dissipated when a circuit is active. A circuit is active anytime
the voltage on an internal node changes due to the input stimulus applied to the circuit and it can be
modeled as,
Pdyn ∝ α× V 2 × f (6.6)
where α represents the average node switching probability. As we notice that from Equation 6.6,
Pdyn is strongly dependent on the circuit voltage and frequency i.e (V , f ) pair. The power dissipated
in detecting and correcting the timing errors (TE) should be accounted in Pdyn for systems using AFS.
This additional component, PT E , can be modeled as,
PT E ∝ k × HD × I0→1 × V (6.7)
where k represents the timing error rate and HD represents the hamming distance between values
stored in registers Main and Backup, and I0→1 is the average current required to change a 1-bit register
logic state ’0’ to state logic ’1’. I0→1 can be easily estimated for a given CMOS technology and the
parameters {k,HD}, depend on the (V, f ) pair.
Voltage
∆Pstat
∆V
∆Pdyn
∆V’
Voltage Voltage
∆P
Figure 6.5 Figure showing the dependence of error in Pstat and Pdyn estimation
with voltage
Equation 6.8 and equation 6.9 model the error in Pstat and Pdyn due to (V, f ) pair misprediction.
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Figure 6.5 presents the dependence of error in power estimation versus voltage. In figure, ratio of ∆V ′
to ∆V is equal to the ratio of Pdyn to Pstat . Large the distance between (V, f ) pairs, higher is the error
in both Pstat and Pdyn. Also, error in Pdyn increases linearly with voltage. Therefore, it is preferable to
operate at high energy (V, f ) pairs.
∆Pstat ∝ ∆V (6.8)
∆Pdyn ∝ ∆V × V (6.9)
With random DVFS approach, where voltage and frequency are one-to-one mapped, Pstat and Pdyn
can be easily estimated, once the (V, f ) pair and the circuit topology are known. But with systems
using random AFS or AVS, Pstat and Pdyn can no longer be estimated accurately for a given circuit
topology. As we notice from Equations 6.8 and 6.9, error in the voltage estimation has direct impact
on correlation factor (ρ). If the timing error events are not detected from the power trace, PT E also
contribute to the deviation in ρ estimation. It is important to note that, at chip-level, power overhead
introduced by timing error circuitry is only 3% of the total power consumption [25]. Therefore, the
impact of PT E on ρ is minimal or negligible. Even if the timing error occurrences are detected and
completely removed from power traces, components Pstat and Pdyn still impact ρ .
Even though PT E contribution towards ρ is negligible, it can still influence ρ estimation by leaking
(V, f ) pair information. As discussed in Section 6.5.2, detection of timing error events will be not
reveal (V, f ) pair information if timing errors happen at more than one voltage for a given frequency or
vice versa. Therefore, each frequency need to support more than two voltage levels. One such example
of (V, f ) spectrum is presented in Table 6.2.
Since, timing error rate at different (V, f ) pairs differ, theoretically it is possible to estimate oper-
ating (V, f ) pair for a module. For a single functional unit like adder, because of data dependency, it
takes more than ’k’ (we estimate k=10,000 based on our experiments) clock cycles to estimate timing
error rate at a given (V, f ) pair. But at system level, attacker can only estimate global error rate. Since
each frequency is mapped to three or more voltages (say V voltages), assuming a module contribu-
tion to global timing error rate is g% and attacker detects timing errors with a% accuracy, for 1GHz
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clock, required DVFS period is the order of (V-1)*10us/(g*a). In a balanced pipeline with ’p’ pipeline
stages and assuming each pipeline stage to produce a timing error equally likely, required DVFS period
is in the order of (V-1)*p*10us/a. For V=3 and p=25, with 66% detection accuracy (as explained in
Section 6.5.2, we need to change (V, f ) pair for every 750 us, which can be easily supported by a
coarse-grained system level switching mechanism. For 1GHz clock, this is equal to 1.5 million cycles.
Typical configurations of cryptosystem are in MHz range. So, even DVFS rate periods larger than
500us are sufficient.
6.7 Security Analysis
To test the resistance offered by our countermeasure, we conducted a series of simulations and then
analyzed the results using Fisher’s Z-transform to test the statistical significance of changes observed
in correlation. After describing Fisher’s Z-transform, we present the changes observed in ρ using our
technique. Next, we discuss how the changes observed in correlation reduce the risk of side-channel
power attacks.
6.7.1 Fisher’s Z-Transform
Using Fisher’s Z-Transform, the correlation can be transformed to a value zρ which has a normal
distribution and the transformation is given by Equation 6.10,
zρ = 0.5∗ ln(1+ρ1−ρ ) (6.10)
where zρ has an approximate normal distribution with variance σ2ρ = 1N−3 , where N in the number
of samples collected to observe ρ . It should be noted that this model is only accurate only when N is
greater than 30. All reported successful attacks used traces much higher than 30. Therefore, the model
is valid all the time. To assess the statistical significance of our results, we have used the procedure
listed as in [43]. We have calculated the normalized difference between ρmax and ρ2nd max values using
Equation 6.11 (from [43])
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∆z = zmax− z2nd max ∗
√
N−3
2
(6.11)
where N is the number of samples collected until ρmax and ρ2nd max are observed. Once the differ-
ence between ρmax and ρ2nd max under Z-transformation has been calculated, their difference is used to
assess the statistical significance under the chosen confidence degree. If the difference between ρmax
and ρ2nd max under Z-transformation calculated, using Equation 6.11, is larger than the critical value,
then we recognize the difference as statistically significant. The larger the difference is, the easier it is
to discern the right guess and therefore, less secure is the system from power attacks. The critical value
at a 95% degree of confidence (typically chosen) is 1.96.
6.7.2 Changes in Correlation Coefficient
Authors in [21] presents a detailed study on the statistical distribution of static and dynamic power.
Statistical power analysis has been performed using 45-nm SOI technology and has estimated the prob-
ability density function of full-chip power. We approximate this distribution as a normal distribution.
Without loss of generality, we also assumed the total power consumption of the system (Eg: a uni-
core processor) using our technique also follows normal distribution. Specifically, we assumed it to be
N(0,1) to simplify our analysis.
For our study, we assume the system can have (V, f ) spectrum similar to one listed in Table 6.2. We
also assume that all (V, f ) pair to occur with equal probability i.e. equally likely. We notice that there
are multiple frequencies which are mapped to more than two voltages. As discussed in Section 6.3.3,
wrong (V, f ) pair changes the trend in the estimated power traces and leads to error accumulation
in ρ calculation, which eventually can lead the attacker to hypothesize a wrong key value. Using
N(0,1) as sampling distribution, for a given ρ , we have generated two different power traces which are
independent and of size N. For every frequency detected, as the attacker can map it to three different
voltages and we assume the probability of success to be 33%. For the rest of time, we assume the
attacker maps it to wrong (V, f ) pair with equal probability.
We also assume the secret key is 8 bit long and our analysis can be easily extended for other
key lengths. Since there are 255 different incorrect keys and one correct key, we have generated 256
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different power traces in the following fashion. Power trace corresponding to correct key is generated
with ρ value of 0.3 i.e ρmax = 0.3. Also one of the incorrect key power traces is generated with ρ value
of 0.05 (representing ρ2nd max) and the remaining power traces generated with ρ values uniformly
chosen from [-.02, 0.02]. We have selected ρmax and ρ2nd max in such way that the difference between
them is statistically significant even for N = 100K.
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Figure 6.6 Distribution of ρmax and ρ2nd max due to (V, f ) pair misprediction
As discussed in Section 6.3.3, wrong (V, f ) pair changes the trend in the power traces and leads
to error accumulation in ρ calculation which can lead the attacker to hypothesize a wrong key. For
our study, we assumed incorrect (V, f ) pair prediction lead to trend change in the original power trace
for 50% of the time with 10% error in the power value. We introduced these changes in the estimated
power traces and calculated the new correlation values for 1000 times and the distribution for ρmax
and ρ2nd max is shown in Figure 6.6. Figure 6.6(a) presents ρ distribution for the correct key and
Figure 6.6(b) presents the ρ2nd max distribution which is observed for one of the 255 different keys with
(V, f ) pair misprediction. From the figure, we notice that mean of new ρmax is smaller than original
ρmax by an order. Also, mean of ρ2nd max is greater than ρmax distribution, implying, on average peak
value of ρ is observed for a wrong key.
6.7.3 Testing changes in ρ
To test if the changes observed in ρ values are of statistical significance, we have applied Fisher’s
Z-transform on ρ as explained in Section 6.7.1. To explain our results, we introduce two probabilities,
p1 and p2, which are defined as:
• p1 = Ratio of number of times ρmax is observed for correct key to total number of attempts.
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Figure 6.7 Figure highlights the area for (a) Probability p1 (b) Probability p2 from
ρmax and ρ2nd max distribution
• p2 = Ratio of number of times ρmax is observed for correct key and the difference between ρmax
and ρ2nd max is statistically significant to total number of attempts.
From the definition, we notice that p1 only considers cases where ρmax > ρ2nd max and doesn’t
take Fisher’s test into account and p2 considers cases where ρmax > ρ2nd max while taking Fisher’s test
into account. Probability p2 represents the probability that the attacker will observe the correlation
peak for the correct key. The highlighted area in Figure 6.7 (a) represents p1 and the highlighted area
in Figure 6.7 (b) represents p2. Table 6.3 presents the observed values of p1 and p2 for our study
presented in Section 6.7.2. In each attempt power trace is collected for 10K inputs.
Number of attempts p1 p2
1K 489/1K 24/1K
5K 2429/5K 126/5K
10K 4953/10K 258/10K
Table 6.3 Values of p1 and p2 for N=10K
From Table 6.3, we notice that p1 is less than 0.5, which implies, peak value of ρ is observed for
wrong key for more than 50% of the time. Also, probability p2 is less than 3% and also it is less than
p1 by an order. This means, with our countermeasure, the attacker will observe peak correlation for the
correct key for less than 3% of the time. Also, for a 10X increase in the number of traces to collect, p2
increases by just 7%.
Reducing p2 alone doesn’t guarantee complete protection from power attacks. This is because,
after multiple attempts if the probability of observing ρmax for correct key is greater than all other
keys, attacker still can extract the secret key and the system can be compromised. We repeated our
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Figure 6.8 Plot showing the frequency for which maximum value of correlation
is found for all possible keys in 500 attempts
experiment for 500 times and the frequency for each key to exhibit ρmax is shown in Figure 6.8. We
notice that the probability of observing maximum rho value for correct key (which is 148) is much
smaller than the other keys. The probability for the actual key to exhibit ρmax is almost smaller by three
times when compared to the wrong keys exhibiting ρmax.
Therefore, from above discussion, we conclude that our countermeasure decreases correlation for
the correct key by an order and reduces the probability to observe ρmax for the correct key. Also, our
technique reduce the risk of power attacks by increasing the probability for incorrect keys to exhibit
ρmax.
Ring Oscillator S-box
Voltage (V) Frequency (GHz) Voltage (V) Frequency ( MHz) TCD (ns) ∆ f ( MHz)
0.8 5.26 0.8 440 0.9 260
0.9 6.54 0.9 540 0.73 320
1 8.06 1 670 0.6 400
1.1 9.21 1.1 760 0.5 450
1.2 10 1.2 830 0.48 500
Table 6.4 DVFS (V, f ) pairs of 7-stage ring oscillator and 8-bit S-box
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6.8 Experiments and Results
In this section, we present our results based on the experiments performed on 8-bit S-box. First, we
measure the timing error rate of S-box and quantify its performance enhancement under AFS. Next, we
estimate the (V, f ) pairs of the 7-stage ring oscillator for given voltage levels. Using this data, we scale
delay values of S-box across different voltage levels. Then, we present the (V, f ) spectrum available
for S-box under DVFS approach. We also present the enhanced (V, f ) spectrum available for S-box
under AFS and present how such enhanced (V, f ) spectrum reduce the risk of power attacks.
6.8.1 Performance enhancement under AFS
For this study, we have modeled 8-bit S-box, part of AES, as a combinational circuit. Input data
is logically XORed with the key and the net result is provided as input to the S-box. For this circuit,
RTL level model is developed and synthesized using the 45nm OSU standard cell library [72]. Timing-
annotated gate level simulations are carried out by extracting timing information in standard delay
format (SDF), and back annotating delay information on the design. From static timing analysis reports,
we estimated the worst case clock period to be 1.5ns and TCD to be 0.56ns. Also estimated area overhead
for integration of timing error detection circuits is around 3%.
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Figure 6.9 Timing error rate versus the clock period for S-box
A key factor that limits the frequency scaling under AFS is the timing error rate. As frequency is
scaled higher beyond the worst case estimate, the number of input combinations that result in delays
greater than the new clock period also increases. So, the timing error rate has been measured to gauge
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the performance improvements provided by AFS approach. At each clock frequency, the total errors
are counted for an execution run of 10,000 cycles and clock period is changed from 1.5ns to 1ns in
steps of 0.05ns. Voltage of the circuit has been kept constant at 1V . Figure 6.9 depicts the percentage
of cycles that produce an error for different clock periods. As shown, although the worst case delay was
estimated at 1.5ns, timing errors do not begin to occur until a period of 1.35ns. Inspite of increasing
timing error rate, the rate of increase in clock frequency is more than the rate of increase in timing
error rate. For clock period at 1ns, timing error is about 23%, giving a net performance enhancement
of 22% over the worst-case estimate. Even though cryptographic circuit outputs have equal toggle
probability, our countermeasure exploits the timing behavior of the output signals. As demonstrated
in our experiment, AES S-box benefits from AFS by improving the clock frequency by almost 33%.
Also, S-box contamination delay is greater than 0.5ns and therefore it can be operated at 1ns without
constraining the shorter paths.
6.8.2 Enhancement of (V, f ) spectrum
To scale delay values across different voltage levels, we measured the worst-case frequency of a
7-stage ring oscillator for different voltage levels. It has been assumed the S-box will have seven levels
of combinational logic. Using a ring oscillator, delay of an inverter can be accurately modeled even
in the presence of temperature variations. Also, it reflects how gate delay varies with the operating
voltage. Using the 7-stage ring oscillator, the worst-case frequency for the single stage was determined
from 0.8 V to 1.2 V in steps of 0.1 V. These results are shown in the first two columns of Table 6.4.
The worst-case delay through the S-box was then determined by appropriately scaling these values,
shown in column 4. Finally the timing constraints from Section 6.5 and the values of TCD given in
column 5 were used to compute the maximum frequency increase (∆ f ) that can be realized using our
AFS approach, given in column 6. Since TCD of S-box is greater than 0.5ns, the frequency swing ∆ f ,
presented in column 5, is achievable with no additional area overhead.
From Table 6.4, we notice that for S-box operating at (1V, 670 MHz), frequency swing of 400 MHz
is possible under AFS. This implies that two new operating pairs - (1V, 760MHz) and (1V, 830MHz)
can be created using AFS. Now using the ∆ f values given in Table 6.4, generic example of mapping
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multiple frequencies to multiple voltage levels in Table 6.2 is transformed to specific voltages and
frequencies, for an AES S-box implemented using 45 nm fabrication technology [72]. It should be
noted while this example only maps three frequency to each voltage level, AFS is not inherently limited
to this number. Table 6.5 lists (V, f ) pairs supported by AFS that break one-to-one mapping between
voltage and frequency. From Table 6.5, we notice that from a total of five DVFS (V, f ) pairs, AFS has
enhanced (V, f ) spectrum to nine pairs. It should be noted that AFS (V, f ) pairs listed in Table 6.5 are
the only pairs that break one-to-one mapping between DVFS (V, f ) pairs and AFS is not inherently
limited to just these pairs. AFS can support many other (V, f ) pairs, for example (1.2V, 1330 MHz).
But these pairs leak voltage information as the frequency associated with them in one-to-one mapped.
Voltage (V) DVFS ( f in MHz) AFS ( f in MHz)
0.8 [0.8, 440] [0.8, 670]
0.9 [0.9, 540] [0.9, 670], [0.9, 760]
1 [1, 670] [1, 670],[1, 760], [1, 830]
1.1 [1.1, 760] [1.1, 760], [1.1, 830]
1.2 [1.2, 830] [1.2, 830]
Table 6.5 Enhanced (V, f ) spectrum for S-box under AFS
6.8.3 Effectiveness of the countermeasure
To test the effectiveness of our countermeasure, we have mounted an attack on 8-bit S-box without
any countermeasure. The system is shown in Figure 6.11. Although the chosen system is small when
compared to a complete crypto system, it enables us to test the effectiveness in a shorter simulation
time. Moreover if a countermeasure is proven to be strong on a system like S-box, it will be more
effective in preventing power attacks on big system like AES.
XOR
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S-box
8
8
Output
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>
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1
Figure 6.11 Block diagram of the attacked system
Spice-level transistor simulations are conducted on a 8-bit S-box implemented using 45nm CMOS
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implementation and the total current is monitored for the attack interval. Hypothetical power consump-
tion is chosen as function of toggle activity at register R1 and the results are shown in Figure 6.12. We
have added noise sampled from N(0,1) to the actual power trace. With the experimental setup chosen,
we are able to detect the correct key with just 10,000 input texts.
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Figure 6.12 Successful power analysis attack on AES S-box without any counter-
measure
To test the effectiveness of our countermeasure, we have used four schemes for estimating operating
(V, f ) pair of S-box. They are 1) High Voltage (HV), 2) Low Voltage (LV), 3) Median Voltage (MV)
and 4) Random Voltage (RV). For a given frequency, HV scheme uses the highest possible voltage, LV
scheme uses the lowest possible frequency, MV scheme uses the median frequency, and RV scheme
uniformly randomly selects one of the possible voltages for (V, f ) pair estimation. For our DVFS
experiments, we used (V, f ) spectrum presented in Table 6.5. Also, for all schemes,we assume that all
(V, f ) pair to occur with equal probability i.e. equally likely. In our experiments, we have assumed (V,
f ) pair is changed every clock cycle. In our attempt using 10,000 plain texts, the four voltage schemes
described couldn’t reveal the secret key and the correlation values are shown in Figure 6.10. From
the figure, we notice that maximum correlation value is less than 0.04 and all possible key correlation
values are in range [-0.03, 0.04]. Also, none of the schemes has revealed the secret key even for one
million plain texts.
For static voltage schemes, with increasing the number of plain texts, error in correlation coefficient
also increases. Error accumulation is dependent on (V, f ) pair misprediction. Increasing number of
traces has little impact on them. But with dynamic voltage scheme, RV, secret key can be revealed if
the (V, f ) misprediction doesn’t change the trend in the estimated power trace. Therefore, we have
repeated the (V, f ) pair estimation using RV scheme for 500 times. Figure 6.13 present the frequency
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Figure 6.13 Plot showing the frequency for which ρmax is found for of all possible
keys using RV voltage scheme for AES S-box
for all possible keys to exhibit peak correlation. In our experiments, we have found that key value 184
(which is an incorrect key) has high probability to exhibit ρmax when compared with all possible keys.
It is found seven times out of 500 attempts. Also, actual key (key value 150) is found only two times
out of 500 attempts and this probability is 3.5X times less than the probability for which ρmax is found
for incorrect key value 184.
6.8.4 Comparing with other countermeasures
Using reliable and aggressive designs, we overcome the limitation of RDVFS and also enable
systems to operate beyond worst-case estimates and enable typical-case operation. As pointed out by
Brooks, this gap is becoming huge in today’s technology [33].
Error recovery of reliable and aggressive system involves loading golden data present in BACKUP
registers (as shown in Figure 3.1(a)) and doesn’t involve recomputation. Therefore, power overheads
do not increase heavily with increase in operating timing error rates, as data loading is a low power
operation when compared to data recomputation. It was shown that, area overheads of aggressive
designs are only about 3% for a microprocessor implementation [25]. Therefore, at chip-level, we can
expect area and power overhead for a cryptosystem also to be in this order. Other countermeasures
involve logic replication, as presented in Section 6.2.2. This will result in increased combinational
area. Our technique involves adding BACKUP registers for timing critical paths resulting only in slight
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increase in sequential area. Also, for our experiments on S-box presented in Section 6.8.1, we didn’t
have to increase contamination delay, implying its inherent support for overclocking
For successful power analysis attacks relatively low clock frequency is needed in the actual experi-
ments [89]. Therefore countermeasures like AFS, which increases clock frequency beyond worst-case
estimate, are preferred. Even though our technique hides (V, f ) pair from the attacker, it differs from
other hiding techniques. Secret key can be recovered if actual (V, f ) pair information is made available.
Therefore, similar to techniques developed in [31, 8], our solution can also be used to detect watermarks
in power traces for intellectual property (IP) detection. This is contrary to all other countermeasures
where IP detection is not possible after the countermeasure deployment.
Recent developments in information technologies demand secure transmission of data, often, at
high encryption rates that require hardware implementation of the security algorithms/protocols. Even
though power attacks have been demonstrated practical on systems like smart cards, they still pose a
threat to complex systems as well like microprocessors, which attempt to offload crypto operations to
dedicated hardware units like a co-processors or reconfigurable hardware. Our solution is applicable to
both custom ASIC and FPGA solutions. Also, support for multiple voltages is being widely deployed
to achieve power savings. Given these future trends, our solution using reliable and aggressive designs,
unify design approaches that aim to improve power, performance, security, and PVT tolerance and add
a new dimension to power attack countermeasures.
Scheme Area Power Performance PVT Tolerance
Logic Style (WDDL) 3X 4X .25X ×
Masking 3X - 0.5X ×
RDVFS[87] - 0.73X 0.85X ×
AFS [73] 1.03X 1.05X 1.57X
√
AVS [25] 1.03X 0.5X 0.95X
√
Table 6.6 Comparison with other schemes in terms of area, power, performance,
and PVT tolerance
6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present an effective countermeasure to counteract DPA/CPA based attacks by
employing reliable and aggressive designs. Salient feature of our approach lays in enabling systems to
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operate beyond the worst-case estimates while breaking the one-to-one relationship between the volt-
age and the frequency of synchronous circuits. Our technique, Aggressive frequency scaling (AFS),
also increases the entropy of power traces and pushes the performance to higher levels by exploiting
data heterogeneity. Also, our technique reduces the probability to observe maximum correlation value
for the correct key and prevents power attacks by increasing the probability for incorrect keys to exhibit
maximum correlation value. For the experiments conducted on 8-bit S-box implemented using 45nm
CMOS technology, the size of (V, f ) spectrum has increased by 1.8X times while offering 22% perfor-
mance improvement over the worst-case estimate. Also, our technique has decreased the correlation
for correct key by an order and has increased the probability by almost 3.5X times for wrong keys,
when compared with the original key, to exhibit maximum correlation.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Advances in semiconductor technology have led to profound integration of devices into many as-
pects of our lives. Along with explosive growth, emphasis on performance and power efficiency also
continue to increase to lead a smoother integration of devices of different form factors. As CMOS
device scaling is reaching its limits, reliable and aggressive systems has the potential and capability to
extend the roadmaps of all computing systems. Also, fabrication technology continues to produce faster
transistors at smaller geometries, the extraction of their full computing potential has become increas-
ingly challenging due to PVT variation. Technology scaling has also radically impacted the soft error
occurrence and fault tolerance is becoming increasingly important due to their increasing susceptibility
to soft errors.
In this work, we have developed two efficient soft error mitigation schemes, SEM and STEM,
considering the approach of multiple clocking of data for tolerating soft errors in combinational logic.
Both these techniques remove the error detection overhead from the circuit critical path. These spe-
cialized register cells provide near 100% fault tolerance against transient faults. Our schemes tolerate
fast transient noise pulses, which is the principal characteristic of SETs. Both our schemes have no
significant performance overhead during error-free operation. SEM cells are capable of ignoring false
positives and recovers from errors using in-situ fast recovery avoiding recomputation. STEM cells has
soft error mitigation characteristics similar to SEM. STEM cells allow reliable dynamic overclocking
and are capable of tolerating timing errors as well. We also propose a scheme to manage phase shifts
between clocks locally with constant delay values. Such an approach increases the possible frequency
settings for aggressively clocked designs and also minimizes the clock routing resources.
Task scheduling continue to play an important role in design of real-time systems and also in high
performance computing systems. In this work, we propose a new slack reclamation algorithm, aggres-
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sive dynamic and voltage scaling (ADVFS), using reliable and aggressive systems. ADVFS exploits the
enhanced voltage frequency spectrum offered by reliable and aggressive designs for improving energy
efficiency. We also provide guidelines on how to manage the enhanced voltage frequency spectrum and
the constraints required for limiting the maximum attainable under ADVFS. We also provide formal
proofs to show that significant energy savings are attainable either by using single frequency or by
linear combination of frequencies. Our scheme can be integrated as post processing step with any of
the existing static and dynamic task scheduling algorithms.
Along with the performance and power constraints, security also is emerging as a first class de-
sign constraint. In this work, we also present an effective countermeasure to counteract DPA/CPA
based attacks by employing reliable and aggressive designs. Salient feature of our approach lays in en-
abling systems to operate beyond the worst-case estimates while breaking the one-to-one relationship
between the voltage and the frequency of synchronous circuits. Our technique, Aggressive frequency
scaling (AFS), also increases the entropy of power traces and pushes the performance to higher levels
by exploiting data heterogeneity. Also, our technique reduces the probability to observe maximum cor-
relation value for the correct key and prevents power attacks by increasing the probability for incorrect
keys to exhibit maximum correlation value.
Overall, our research results using circuit level timing speculation are very encouraging and looked
at the possibility of unifying various system design constraints like performance, power, reliability and
security. This work also lays a strong foundation that in deep submicron era systel design constraints
should not be viewed in isolation and unification of them can lead to much efficient and adaptive
systems. The techniques we introduced and explored in reliable and aggressive framework holds good
prospect for further research.
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